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THE ROLE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
Robert A. Katz' & Antony Page"
INTRODUCTION
A market economy predictably under-produces certain urgent public or
collective goods, such as a clean environment. It also perpetuates gross
inequalities in resources among people and across regions. Recently, there
has been growing interest in privately-led approaches that use business
methods and forms for the express purpose of repairing society' and which
go under the labels of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship. One of
these approaches, the social enterprise, can be defined as "an organization
or venture that achieves its primary social or environmental mission using
business methods,"2 typically by operating a revenue-generating business.
So defined, a social enterprise may be organized as either a nonprofit or for-
profit entity.4 It can also be set up using an organizational form specifically
designed for social enterprises-one that seeks to "hybridize" or blend
components of both nonprofit and for-profit endeavors. Social enterprises
are founded by "social entrepreneurs," a broader term that denotes an
ambitious person who seeks social change on a large scale,
characteristically through earned income strategies.5
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis and Professor of
Philanthropic Studies at the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy.
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1. Ben Cohen, On Becoming an Ecopreneur, in THE GREEN FESTIVAL READER: FRESH IDEAS
FROM AGENTS OF CHANGE 50, 51 (Kevin Danaher & Alisa Gravitz eds., 2008).
2. Social Enterprise: Defining the Movement, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, http://www.se-
alliance.org/aboutmovement.cfm (last visited Sept. 16, 2010). This definition is advanced by the Social
Enterprise Alliance, which describes itself as "the only member organization in North America to bring
together the diverse field of social enterprise. It serves as advocate for the field, hub of information and
education, and builder of a vibrant and growing community of social enterprises." Id.
3. PAUL C. LIGHT, THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP 5 (2008); see also Dennis
R. Young, Alternative Perspectives on Social Enterprise, in NONPROFITS & BUSINESS 21, 23 (Joseph J.
Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2009) ("Social enterprise is activity intended to address social goals
through the operation of private organizations in the marketplace.").
4. See SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, supra note 2 ("The social enterprise movement
includes both nonprofits that use business models to pursue their mission and for-profits whose primary
purposes are social. Social mission is primary and fundamental; the organizational form depends on
what will best advance the social mission.").
5. Jo Barraket, Recasting Our Thinking? Social Enterprise and Social Value Creation in a Network
Era, CPNS-QUT-Nonprofit Podcast, Program 32,2 (Mar. 3,2009), http://www.bus.qutedu.au/research/cpnst
podcast/documents/podcast32transcriptpdf ("The language of social entrepreneurship ... has found resonance
with those concemed with dynamic individuals who utilise [sic] entrepreneurial strategies to progress social
objectives inside and outside organisational [sic] structures, and across sectoral divisions.") (citation omitted);
Jerr Boschee & Jim McClurg, Toward a Better Understanding of Social Entrepreneurship: Some Important
Distinctions 3 (2003), httpJ/www.se-alliance.org/better_understanding.pdf ("A social entrepreneur is any
person, in any sector, who uses earned income strategies to pursue a social objective. . . .").
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An increasing number of people and entities are coalescing under these
banners. Their expanding influence is reflected in the 2006 Nobel Peace
Prize awarded to Muhammad Yunus, a leading promoter of microfinance
and the concept of "social business;"' the growth of centers for social
entrepreneurship at leading business schools such as Harvard and Stanford;7
and media attention such as Business Week's annual list of "America's 25
Most Promising Social Entrepreneurs."8 The Obama Administration has
also unveiled several initiatives to encourage the growth of social
enterprise.9 Even Bill Gates (a proponent of "creative capitalism")'o and
Pope Benedict XVI (who calls for "a profoundly new way of understanding
business enterprise")" have promoted the notion of business organizations
and executives making decisions that are not purely profit-driven.
For many years, social enterprise was associated mainly with nonprofit
organizations, which have no owners in the conventional sense and whose
controllers can earn no more than "reasonable" compensation. The first
wave of contemporary social enterprises was based in nonprofit
organizations and gained significant momentum during the 1980s.12 Over
time, a growing number of nonprofit organizations began to embrace and
pursue earned income strategies, largely as a means to reduce their
dependence on donations and grants.' 3 Earned income also expanded the
6. See Vikas Bajaj, Out to Maximize Social Gains, Not Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006,
http://nytimes.com (enter "Out to Maximize Social Gains, Not Profit" in Search; then follow "Out to
Maximize Social Gains, Not Profit" hyperlink) (describing Mr. Yunus's recent Nobel Peace Prize and
his partnering with Groupe Danone to start a "social business").
7. America's Best Colleges for Entrepreneurs, Best for Social Entrepreneurs, CNNMONEY.COM,
httpl/money.cnn.com/galleries/2007/fsb/0708/gallery.bestcolleges social.fsb/index.htmi (last visited Oct. 10,
2010).
8. John Tozzi, America's Most Promising Social Entrepreneurs, NEW ENTREPRENEUR BLoG (June
8,2010), BUSINESSWEEK.COM, http-//www.businessweek.com/smallbizrnningtnsmallbusiness/archives/2010
/06/americasmostpronmisingsocial entrepreneurs.html.
9. Anne Field, Obama Gives Big Boost to Global Rating System for Social Enterprises,
TRUE/SLANT (Apr. 27, 2010, 3:42 PM), http//trueslant.com (noting that Obama supports a rating system for
social enterprises to encourage investment by socially-concemed investors seeking more robust means for
measuring their social and environment achievements). The Obama administration also encourages innovations
in the nonprofit sector through its Office of Social Innovation. See, e.g., Press Release, The White House Office
of the Press Sec'y, President Obama to Request $50 Million to Identify and Expand Effective, Innovative Non-
Profits (May 5, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pressoffice/President-Obama-to-Request-
50-Million-to-Identify-and-Expand-Effective-Innovative-Non-Profits.
10. Bill Gates, Making Capitalism More Creative, TIME, July 31, 2008, www.time.com/time/
business/article/0,8599,1828069,00.html.
11. Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate of the Supreme Pontiff Benedict XVI to the Bishops Priests
and Deacons Men and Women Religious the Lay Faithful and All People of Good Will on Integral Human
Development in Charity and Truth, 40 (Jun. 29,2009), available at http//www.vatican.va/holy father/benedi
ct-xvi/encycicals/documents/hf ben-xvienc_20090629_caritas-in-veritate en.html (emphasis omitted).
12. See, e.g., Barraket, supra note 5, at 2 ("The idea of social enterprise was popularised [sic]
in the early 1990s and has gained considerable traction in public policy frameworks and not for personal
profit management practices in a number ofregions around the world.") (citation omitted).
13. Id.
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controllers' power over their organization's resources because earned
income-unlike donations-is generally unencumbered by donor-imposed
restrictions on its use.14
Nonprofit organizations have of course been earning income for many
years. In some nonprofits, a revenue-generating activity may be its "very
reason for existence""s and inextricably connected to the accomplishment of
its mission. Examples include the tuition-funded nonprofit school that
imparts knowledge to each paying student and the self-financing religious
publisher that spreads The Word with each book sold.'6 In other nonprofits,
as with a church bake sale, the business activity is unrelated to the
organization's mission and is conducted solely to raise funds to support
mission functions.
Yet, there were several novel and noteworthy aspects about the
growing interest among nonprofits for earned income that took off during
the 1980s. First, some proponents of these projects saw themselves as
vanguards whose members rejected the traditional ethos that denigrated
nonprofit business activity as a commercialism of dubious ethicality.17
Also, some new wave nonprofit social entrepreneurs pursued ambitious
strategies to raise revenues though business activities that directly advanced
their organizations' missions.18
More recently, the term or concept of "social enterprise" has been
applied to some for-profit business ventures with social missions. 19 We
refer to these entities as "for-profit social enterprises."20 Other terms for
members of this genus include "hybrid social ventures,"21 "for-profit social
14. Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and its Financing: Growing Links Between
Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 1, 14-16 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998) (analyzing the
trend for nonprofit organizations to rely more heavily on commercial sales activity compared to
charitable donations).
15. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 593 (3d ed. 2006).
16. Id.
17. Boschee & McClurg, supra note 5, at I ("Twenty years ago the idea of nonprofits acting in
an entrepreneurial manner was anathema to most people in the sector: The idea of merging mission and
money filled them with distaste.").
18. See, e.g., Evolution of the Social Enterprise Industry: A Chronology of Key Events, THE
INST. FOR Soc. ENTREPRENEURS 3 (Aug. 1, 2008), http://socialent.org/FreeDownloads.htm (follow
"Evolution of the Social Enterprise Industry: A Chronology of Key Events" hyperlink) (last visited Sept.
2, 2010) ("Social enterprises directly confront social needs through their products and services rather
than indirectly through ... [inter alia] the unrelated business activities mounted by nonprofits.")
(emphasis in original).
19. Daniel J. Isenberg, An Indian FOPSE: Innovations Case Discussion: Keggfarms,
INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION, Winter 2008, at 52, 55 n.1 ("[For-profit social
enterprises] have explicitly stated goals of earning a profit while solving a major societal problem.").
Isenberg asserts that he coined the term "for-profit social enterprise" in April 2007. Id at 54.
20. Id.
21. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 337, 337 (2009).
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businesses," 22  "social purpose business ventures," 23  blended value
organizations, companies with a conscience, Fourth Sector organizations,24
a "for profit with a nonprofit soul,"25 and for-benefit organizations. 26 Like a
nonprofit social enterprise, a for-profit social enterprise expressly seeks to
use business means to address social problems. Yet unlike a nonprofit
social enterprise, it is owned (in whole or in part) by equity investors, and
one of its core goals (alongside its social purposes) is to generate returns for
those investor-owners. These investor-owners include founders who are
entitled to a portion of the proceeds from the organization's sale or an initial
public offering (IPO). Thus, an essential difference between nonprofit and
for-profit social enterprises is the ability of the enterprise's founders,
controllers and investors to lawfully appropriate its surpluses for their
private benefit.
According to one commentator, social entrepreneurs as a group are
shifting their focus "away from the non-profit sector, traditionally in charity
and philanthropic activities, towards entrepreneurial private-sector oriented
business activities."27 As interest in for-profit social enterprise grows, so too
does interest in legal and regulatory strategies to encourage the creation and
flourishing of for-profit social enterprises. Many social entrepreneurs,
reports Professor Thomas Kelley, believe that "outmoded law and
inappropriate old-style legal entities hamstring their socially transformative
plans."28 At the same time, maintains Kelley, many social entrepreneurs
crave "new laws, in particular new legal entities, to provide structures better
suited" to ventures that seek social and environmental betterment, in
addition to enriching their owners.
In response, legislators, practitioners, and scholars are devoting more
resources to exploring organizational forms and public policies to promote
for-profit social enterprise. In recent years, a number of jurisdictions have
enacted (or are contemplating) a variety of legal forms intended to foster the
creation of for-profit social enterprises and the activities of social
22. Barraket, supra note 5.
23. Boschee & McClurg, supra note 5, at 4.
24. Heerad Sabeti et al., The Emerging Fourth Sector: A New Sector of Organizatioms at the
Intersection ofthe Public, Private, and Social Sectors: Executive Summary, 4 (2009) http//www.fourthsector.n
et/attachments/39/originallMeEmergingOFourth Sector - ExecSummary.pdf.
25. What is the L3C?, AMs. FOR CMTY. DEV., http//americansforeommunitydevelopmentorg/
downloads/WhatisTheL3C.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2010) ("'The L3C is the 'for profit with the nonprofit
soul."') (citing Robert Lang and crediting him with the creation of the L3C).
26. Sabeti, supra note 24.
27. Jirgen Nagler, The Importance of Social Entrepreneurship for Economic Development
Policies 2 (Apr. 3, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://sites.google.com/site/jjnagler/Ho
me/ReportJNaglerSocialEntrepreneurshipandDevelopment.pdf
28. Kelley, supra note 21, at 340-41.
29. Id. at 341.
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entrepreneurs seeking equity investors. These include, most notably, the
low-profit limited liability company (L3C) enacted in Vermont and several
other states; the United Kingdom's Community Interest Company (CIC);30
and the "benefit corporation" recently enacted in Maryland,' Vermont,32
and under consideration in several states including New York.33 The
California legislature is currently considering another corporate form called
the "flexible purpose corporation."3 4 There is also growing interest in a
private-sector accreditation scheme called "B Lab,"3 s which provides
standards for "social enterprises" and that certifies businesses for
compliances with its standards.
Part I of this Article examines nonprofit organizations. In this section,
we are especially interested in the potential role of nonprofit organizations
as sites for social entrepreneurship and as instruments of social change-
namely, nonprofit social enterprises. This section identifies perhaps the core
problem that nonprofit organizations seek to address, namely, the
predictable failure of market economies to optimize social welfare and
mitigate economic inequality. It explores the economic functions that
nonprofit organizations can serve generally (i.e., they can mitigate the
agency costs that can arise in situations where there is severe information
asymmetry between a supplier of goods and services and its "patrons," and
where these agency costs cannot be adequately addressed by ordinary
contractual mechanisms). We focus on commercial nonprofits that
undertake to help society by producing "mixed" public/private goods-that
is, (a) private goods that are bought for the purchaser's private
consumption, and (b) that nonetheless have significant positive
externalities. Lastly, we consider the government's regulation of nonprofits
and especially how it challenged commercial nonprofits to develop earned-
30. See generally, Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/1788 (U.K.),
available at http//www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/1788/contents/made (creating regulations for community
interest companies).
31. John Tozzi, Maryland Passes 'BenefitCorp.' Law for Social Entrepreneurs, NEW
ENTREPRENEUR BLOG (Apr. 13, 2010), BUSINESSWEEK, http://www.businessweek.com/smallbizlrunnin
g smallbusiness/archives/2010/04/benefit corpbi.html.
32. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 IA, §§ 21.01-21.14 (2010) (establishing "benefit corporations" in the
state of Vermont).
33. N.Y. S.B. 7855, Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2010) (authorizing the incorporation of benefit
corporations), available at open.nysenate.gov/legislation/apilhtml/bill/s7855.
34. See S.B. 1463, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2010); see also W. Derrick Britt, R. Todd
Johnson & Susan H. MacCormac, Frequently Asked Questions: The Flexible Purpose Corporation 1
(Jan. 5, 2010), available at www.primakers.net/files/FAQ%20re%2Othe%20Flexible%20Purpose%2OCo
rp.doc (last visited Sept. 2, 2010) (explaining that the new organizational form was "designed to
facilitate the organization of companies in California with greater flexibility for combining profitability
with a broader social or environmental purpose").
35. CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http//www.bcorporation.net (follow "About B Corp"
hyperlink; then follow "Who Certifies?") (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
632010]
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income activities that are significantly related to their charitable missions.
Commercial nonprofits thus pioneered the concept of social enterprise and
some of these insights were carried over to the for-profit social enterprise
context.
Part II considers what for-profit social enterprises might be, how they
can address market shortcomings, and why they might sometimes do so
more successfully than nonprofit social enterprises. In other words, we
identify some of the obstacles faced by nonprofit social enterprises that for-
profit social enterprises might be better able to overcome. One comparative
advantage of for-profit social enterprises is their ability to provide social
entrepreneurs, employees, and investors with more financial inducement to
tackle social problems in effective ways. This Part considers some of the
elements of nonprofit organizations, law and policy that allegedly
necessitate the creation of new legal forms specifically tailored to for-profit
social enterprises. In doing this, we ask: What is the comparative advantage
of for-profit social enterprises compared to traditional forms in achieving
this goal? We also look at an obvious challenge faced by for-profit social
enterprise-the balance between social and financial mission.
Part III distinguishes between two approaches to the for-profit social
enterprise's distinct value proposition, with each pushing the law of social
enterprise in a different direction. The first approach is grounded in the
organizational law of nonprofit and charitable organizations. This
"nonprofit lite" approach seeks to address market failure by attracting
resources into a legal form that is explicitly committed to generating social
value in perpetuity. A key goal is for the organization to survive even after
the social entrepreneur's exit or loss of enthusiasm. From the "nonprofit
lite" perspective, the main challenge of social enterprise law is tweaking the
asset lock (the prohibition on distributing residual income) and control
mechanisms at the margins to ensure greater access to capital and talent.
The second approach is grounded in the broader ambitions of social
entrepreneurship, which is to increase supply of public goods by
transforming markets and preferences thereby creating a new more socially-
optimal equilibrium. The social entrepreneur looks to more fundamental
and sustainable changes in the way things are done that go well beyond the
venture's earned income. Ideally, the new equilibrium will require of
market participants no (or at least much less) explicit altruism. Because the
social enterprise itself may be transitional and need not survive in order to
be successful, asset locks and control mechanisms are less important. It is
the overall social change which the social enterprise initiated that is most
important, not the particular social enterprise itself.
64 [Vol. 35:059
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This Article concludes that, though at the organizational level the for-
profit social enterprise has some clear comparative advantages, we should
be wary of regulation adapted from the nonprofit context that may dilute
these advantages.
I. THE LAW AND EcoNOMIC ROLE OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AND
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
In liberal capitalist societies, we tend to look first to markets to allocate
resources efficiently and in this way increase social welfare. We then look
to other sectors and institutions-government and nongovernmental
nonprofit organizations-to help counter any market shortcomings. For
many reasons, nonprofit organizations serve as apt instruments for
privately-led efforts to improve society.
This section examines nonprofit organizations, their key
characteristics, and how they can serve to address market shortcomings. It
then discusses how government helps nonprofit organizations perform these
roles through its organizational laws and tax policies. Some of these entities
may be usefully described as nonprofit social enterprises. This discussion
lays the foundation for the subsequent examination of for-profit social
enterprises.
A. Market Shortcomings
In developed countries, markets operate tolerably well to allocate
consumer goods (such as television sets) to final purchasers for their
personal consumption.3 6 Yet markets have at least two serious flaws that
reduce their efficacy as instruments for improving social welfare and human
happiness. First, they predictably undersupply public or collective goods.
Examples of such goods include national defense, basic infrastructure,
environmental protection, listener-sponsored radio, improved race relations,
and community development.37 These market failures are more likely to
occur when the parties engaged in an activity do not enjoy all the benefits it
generates (i.e., there are positive externalities).38 This result inheres in the
36. Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis,
Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REv. 395, 415 (1997) ("Economic theory tells us that
consumers usually know what goods and services they want to buy, that they are usually able to tell
whether they got what they paid for, and that competition among for-profit suppliers usually ensures that
they paid the lowest possible price.").
37. R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 358 (1974). Lighthouses
used to be the textbook example of a public good, but later research has called this into question. Id. at
375.
38. See OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 160 (John Black, et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009) (defining
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nature of public goods, which generally cannot be limited to those who pay
for them.
Consider the olfactory enjoyment that a store selling chocolate confers
on those who live or work nearby. In economic terms, public goods such as
chocolate aroma are non-rivalrous (i.e., one party's enjoyment of such
goods does not preclude their enjoyment by others) and non-excludable
(i.e., such goods cannot be provided to payors without also providing them
to non-payors). Conversely, public "bads" tend to occur when the parties
engaged in an activity do not incur all the harm and costs it imposes. These
are negative externalities. Consider the effluents that a paper mill dumps
into a river that affect those downstream. Where the externalities generated
by a firm's activities do not affect its financial bottom line, the firm may be
less motivated to consider these externalities. Such firms are thus less likely
to produce public goods and public bads in socially optimal quantities-
either too little or too much.
Second, unaided markets have difficulty in reducing the human misery
that results from inequalities of wealth and other resources. According to
neoclassical economists, the economic value of a good or service is a
function of how much people are either willing to pay for it or be paid to
part with it.39 In this view, the market in equilibrium does not directly
register the suffering of persons whose limited income puts life's
necessities beyond their reach.40 Judge Posner illustrates this point:
Suppose that pituitary extract is in very short supply relative to
the demand and is therefore very expensive. A poor family has a
child who will be a dwarf if he doesn't get some of the extract,
but the family cannot afford the price .... A rich family has a
child who will grow to normal height, but the extract will add a
few inches more, and his parents decide to buy it for him. In the
sense of value used in [Posner's economic analysis of law], the
pituitary extract is more valuable to the rich family than to the
poor one, because value is measured by willingness to pay; but
the extract would confer greater happiness in the hands of the
poor family than in the hands of the rich one.
positive externalities as "effects of an activity which are pleasant or profitable for other people who cannot
be charged for them").
39. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, 10 (7th ed. 2007).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 369 cmt. d (stating that "a trust to assist persons
who have an income which does not afford the necessities of life without such assistance is charitable,"
even though such persons "are not absolutely destitute").
41. POSNER, supranote 39, at 11.
66 [Vol. 35:059
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Insofar as the market responds to raw human need, it does so indirectly
and derivatively. A relatively well-to-do person donates money to a relief
organization that assists indigents. This donor may experience some
humanitarian satisfaction from improving the indigents' condition. This
satisfaction, however, derives from the indigents' increased well-being (i.e.,
as a positive externality of the indigents' consumption of the assistance
provided). Moreover, the donor's satisfaction-as reflected or registered in
her willingness to "pay" or donate a certain sum-is probably only a
fraction of the satisfaction that the indigents experience.
B. Defining Nonprofit, Charitable, and Tax-exempt Organizations
Ownership may be defined as "[t]he right to exclusive use of an
asset'42-most notably, in the case of an organization, the rights to control
the asset, capture its net earnings or profits, and transfer it for consideration.
A nonprofit organization lacks ownership in this sense.43 Although it has
controllers (e.g., managers, directors, and trustees), they are legally
prohibited from appropriating the organization's net earnings for their
personal benefit.44 A nonprofit cannot offer controllers a share in equity, nor
can it use salary as a device or pretext for distributing profits to them.4s
Economist and law professor Henry Hansmann identifies this prohibition-
the "nondistribution constraint"-as the nonprofit's critical and defining
characteristic.46
A nonprofit may compensate controllers for the goods, services, and
capital they render to the firm. Such compensation must, however, be
reasonable.47 This "fair compensation constraint"-as Professors Richard
Steinberg and Bradford H. Gray call it-is a corollary of the non-
distribution constraint.48 In the case of employment, it discourages a
nonprofit organization from paying bonuses to managers when its profits
42. OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 38, at 331 (explaining that the owner's
use of an asset may be limited by the state, which can tax it, regulate it, appropriate it in whole or in part
for public use, and also by persons who have acquired contractual rights over the asset).
43. HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 228 (1996) [hereinafter HANSMANN,
THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE] (noting that shareholders in a corporation, although having full
ownership of their shares, only have limited ownership rights regarding the corporation itself).
44. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980)
[hereinafter Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise].
45. Id. at 838, 900.
46. HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE, supra note 43; Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44.
47. Richard Steinberg & Bradford H. Gray, "The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise" in 1993:
Hansrnann Revisited, 22 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 297, 302 (1993) (noting that salaries




are high. 49 These controllers will tend to earn less than their for-profit
counterparts-especially in sectors where for-profit firms pay a significant
part of compensation in equity shares, stock options, or otherwise based on
stock performance. In those sectors, explains Hansmann, "it is likely to be
only the salary portion of a for-profit manager/entrepreneur's compensation
that is taken as a norm in determining whether the salary received by the
manager/entrepreneur of a nonprofit is excessive.',5  This hurts a nonprofit
controller's earning potential because the benchmark for comparison-the
salary portion of a for-profit controller's compensation-is generally not as
large without taking into account full compensation provided to for-profit
managers based on equity shares.1
A nonprofit organization can generate profits at the institutional level
(i.e., its revenues may exceed expenses).52 Yet a nonprofit's controllers are
obliged to do more than merely refrain from diverting the entity's surplus to
themselves. They have an affirmative duty to advance the organization's
mission, for example, by supplying more of whatever the entity was
organized to supply." A poverty-relief organization, for example, may
distribute its profits to indigent people in cash or in-kind (e.g., food and
shelter). A nonprofit's controllers are thus fiduciaries who hold the
organization's assets in trust for its declared purposes and intended
beneficiaries. 5 4 The flip-side of the non-distribution constraint is an
injunction to actively pursue the organization's social mission. This
characteristic separates the typical nonprofit organization from the for-profit
firm, which "generally has, as its chief business activity, the direct and
indirect transfer of money or other property (essentially, its profits) to or for
the benefit of its shareholders" or owners.
The most familiar type of nonprofit organization is the charity, which
advances purposes deemed charitable under the law of trusts. Legally
charitable purposes include the relief of poverty, the advancement of
religion, education, and health, as well as lessening the burdens of
government." Charities are typically set up as nonprofit corporations or
49. See, e.g., Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L.
REv. 2017, 2024 (2007) (stating a nonprofit controller's compensation "may not be a proxy for profits
(for example, bonuses when profits are high)").
50. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 900.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 880 ("All nonprofit organizations, just like profit-seeking organizations, ultimately
must cover the full economic cost of all resources that they consume, including both the cost of labor
and all other variable inputs and a reasonable return on any capital employed in their activities.").
53. Id. at 838.
54. HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE, supra note 43, at 228.
55. 46 AM. JUR. 3D ProofofFacts § 3 (1998).
56. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 4 (2000) (explaining that charities are regarded as trusts).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 368 (1959).
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charitable trusts under state organizational law. Each body of law imposes
its own formulation of the non-distribution constraint. The Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act (Third Edition) states that "a nonprofit corporation shall
not pay dividends or make distributions of any part of its assets, income, or
profits to its members, directors, members of a designated body, or
officers."ss The Restatement (Second) of Trusts states that a charitable trust
cannot be a "proprietary institution" (i.e., the "profits derived from its
operation" cannot be paid to specified beneficiaries other than members of a
charitable class and the trust's intended and legally-permissible
beneficiaries).59 The Restatement also declares that any profits earned by a
charity must "be applied only to charitable purposes."60
Charities typically benefit society by supplying public goods. These
might be either pure public goods (e.g., a cleaner environment) or impure
public goods (often referred to as "mixed" goods), which are private
goods6' that confer substantial positive externalities. "Mixed public goods
and services," explains Professor Nina Crimm, "indirectly benefit the
public, but provide direct benefits to special groups of people."62 Consider
an art museum, which can make a "community a more appealing and
exciting place for all persons to live," while at the same time can directly
benefit those who visit it.63 In the same vein, Professor George Bogert and
his coauthors consider a charitable trust to relieve poverty in a particular
city.6 In common parlance, writes Bogert, the term "beneficiary" applies to
the specific individuals who receive food, shelter, and clothing from the
trust.65 Yet the larger community can also benefit from the trust's activities,
which may, for example, reduce crime or create a more productive
workforce.66 In this sense, the trust's direct beneficiaries are "conduits of
the social benefits to the public," and the "instrumentalities through which
the community benefits flow."67
58. MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT § 6.40 (a) (3d ed. 2008).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 cmt. a (1959).
60. Id. at § 376 cmt. d.
61. OxFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 38, at 357 (defining "private good").
62. Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations: A Theory ofRisk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REV. 419, 441 (1998) (citation omitted).
63. Id.
64. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 363, at 27 (2d
ed. 1991).
65. Id.
66. Id at 27-28.
67. Id. Like Crimm, Bogert elaborates this point by invoking an art museum, whose
"educational and cultural advantages .. . flow [both] to the neighboring community and its visitors." Id.
at 28 (emphasis added).
2010] 69
Vermont Law Review
The categories of nonprofit and charitable organizations were created
by state organizational law. 8 Federal tax law reinforces these categories
and adds new dimensions to them. Most nonprofit organizations are eligible
for tax-exempt status under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).6 9
This means that an organization is exempt from paying corporate income
taxes on its net income. 70 Federal tax law reiterates the nondistribution
constraint by denying 501(c) tax-exempt status unless no part of an
organization's net earnings inure to the benefit of "any private shareholder
or individual."7  Lastly, federal tax law contains a category-section
501(c)(3)-whose criteria more or less overlap with those for charitable
organizations under state law.72 When an organization is organized and
operated for charitable or "exempt" purposes under § 501(c)(3), its donors
can deduct their contributions from their income taxes.
C. The Economic Role ofNonprofit Organizations
Hansmann proposed a distinct economic role for nonprofit
organizations in a market economy.74 These entities can be useful when
prospective purchasers (or donors) cannot readily monitor the supplier.
Prospective purchasers may see a supplier's nonprofit form as a signal that
it (or more precisely, its founders and controllers) will behave in a way
more aligned with the purchasers' interests than the suppliers' for-profit
counterparts. In these situations, the nonprofit form can help assure
prospective purchasers that suppliers will perform as promised.76
It is essential to note that a social entrepreneur's interest in nonprofit
organizations is narrower than Hansmann's. Hansmann explores how
nonprofit organizations might address a wide range of situations that he
68. Allen R. Bromberger, Social Enterprise: A Lawyer's Perspective 4 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http//www.perimanandperlman.com/publications/articles/2008/socialenterprise.pdf.
69. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2006) (including "organizations not organized for profit" under
exempt status).
70. An otherwise tax-exempt organization may be taxed on the income generated by business
activities that are unrelated to their charitable missions. Id. § 511(a)(l)-(2).
71. Id. at § 501(c)(3). The term "shareholder or private individual" refers to an "insider," i.e.,
someone who by virtue of his position can control or influence an organization's action. Inurement
occurs when an insider diverts a charity's proceeds for his or her private benefit. See Variety Club Tent
No. 6 Charities Inc. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485, 1492 (1997) (defining "insider").
72. See 1.R.C. § 501(c)(3); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 589-92 (1983)
(holding that all 501(c)(3) organizations must conform to certain fundamental common law charitable
criteria).
73. I.R.C. § 170.
74. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprises, supra note 44, at 837.
75. Id. at 845.
76. Id. at 899-901.
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calls "contract failure."n By this he means situations in which agency costs
are so severe that ordinary market mechanisms and contractual devices
cannot be relied upon to ensure a supplier's performance." Contract failures
can occur with respect to both public goods and private goods. These
failures include situations where the market undersupplies some public
good, due in part to the presence of positive externalities, or agency costs
deter private parties from transacting for primarily private goods.79
Unlike Hansmann, the social entrepreneur is primarily interested in
organizational forms as a way to promote privately-led efforts to supply
mixed goods (i.e., goods and services supplied to paying consumers for
their private consumption but which also generate substantial positive
externalities). One way to do this is by making it less costly for private
parties to engage effective and faithful agents to execute their wishes.
1. Mitigating the Agency Problem
From an efficiency perspective, say leading nonprofit economists,
"nonprofits are uniquely suited to supply particular types of goods and
services" 8 -most notably, those goods and services whose quality or
quantity the purchaser cannot readily assess due to severe information
asymmetries vis-A-vis the suppliers." For Hansmann, this purchaser can be
either a donor who pays for a third party's consumption or a customer who
buys an item for her own consumption.82 Hansmann uses the same term,
"patron," to refer to both types of purchasers." In either case, the situation
creates an agency relationship between the patron and supplier. Agency
problems arise when the supplier's aims and interests diverge from the
patron's interest. When the information asymmetry is severe, the patron
cannot readily or practically observe the supplier's effort and
performance.
77. Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 57-84 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 1987).
78. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprises, supra note 44, at 845, 860.
79. See generally, id. at 846-50 (providing examples of contract failure due to public inadequate
agency accountability and oversupply of public goods).
80. Steven Rathgeb Smith & Kirsten A. Granbjerg, Scope and Theory of Government-
Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 221, 223 (Walter W. Powell
& Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
81. Information asymmetries are simply where one party knows something that another does
not. George Akerlof famously explored the problem and means of mitigation. George Akerlof, The
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970).
82. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 841.
83. Id.
84. OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 38, at 7 (defining "agency theory").
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When a patron cannot readily observe the supplier's performance, she
might instead try to assess the supplier's motives. In such a situation, she
might see the supplier's organizational form as a proxy or signal of those
motives, and reasonably conclude that these are more closely aligned with
her interests than a for-profit controller's. Why might that be? In any given
sector, Hansmann posits, some entrepreneurs and controllers would prefer
to start or run a high-quality institution" (i.e., one that may forgo some
profits in order to maintain or raise quality). Hansmann refers to such
persons as "craftsmanlike" and contrasts them to "greedy" people who are
mainly interested in increasing their personal wealth. Craftsmanlike
persons are so committed to their craft that they may accept less
compensation in order to maintain higher standards. In a nonprofit firm, for
reasons explained, controllers and employees may feel less pressure to
forgo quality for profit. As a result, craftsmanlike people might prefer to
start or run a nonprofit firm in order to insulate themselves and their
institutions from shareholder demands to sacrifice social mission for greater
profitability. Additionally, business-savvy persons might see the nonprofit
form as giving them a competitive advantage regarding quality with patrons
who are more wary of for-profit competitors.
2. Donative Nonprofits
Donative nonprofits can reduce the agency costs that may accompany
gratuitous transfers. This is most clear when firms solicit funds to help third
persons whom the donors do not know, such as an organization that assists
the victims of an overseas disaster. The agency problem is serious in such
cases, explains Hansmann, because relatively few donors "could ever be
expected to travel to India or Africa to see if the food they paid for was in
fact ever delivered. . ."88 Here again, the intermediary's legal form can
affect the agency problem. If the intermediary is "organized for profit, it
would have a strong incentive to skimp on the services it promises [donors
85. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 899.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 846-47.
88. Id. at 847. The notion of a donor monitoring the use of his donation is mocked in the
satirical paper, The Onion. See Area Man Visits Haiti to Check up on $10 Donation, THE ONION, May
28, 2010, www.theonion.com/articles/area-man-visits-haiti-to-check-up-on-10-donation,17503.
Three months after a 7.0 earthquake rocked the impoverished island nation of
Haiti, 36-year-old Brad Halder visited its demolished capital to see firsthand how
his $10 donation to a relief fund was being spent. "It's been a little while, so I just
wanted to check in and make sure my money was being put to good use," Halder
told reporters while surveying the still largely devastated region.
Id.
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to deliver to third parties], or even to neglect to perform them entirely, and,
instead, to divert most or all of its revenues directly to its owners."
The prospective donor engages the relief organization to deliver
assistance to the intended beneficiaries. This organization is a "leaky
bucket" insofar as it wastes its donors' gifts through inefficient behavior or
siphons off some of the gifts for its controllers' enrichment (i.e., payments
in excess of reasonable compensation).90 As a result, the patron must either
tolerate a certain amount of leakage or spend more resources on monitoring.
Or she may conclude that, given the ratio between relief versus waste and
pilfering, she will derive more satisfaction by spending the proposed sum
on something else, such as a flat-screen television for her exclusive personal
enjoyment. Thus, agency costs can reduce the amount of private giving for
public goods (thereby making agency costs a problem for both patron and
supplier) in addition to reducing the effectiveness of the private giving.
Hansmann's analysis best explains donative nonprofits that supply
nearly pure public goods, such as listener-supported radio stations.
Information asymmetry arises because the patron "cannot observe the
marginal increment to the service" that her donation ostensibly finances
(e.g., radio broadcasts).9 ' In other words, "she cannot know from direct
observation whether the same quantity and quality of service would have
been provided even without her contribution."92 The prospective patron
might refuse to contribute to a for-profit station on the grounds that its
owners presumably have incentive "to solicit payments far in excess of the
total needed to pay for its broadcasts, and simply to distribute the difference
to the owners as profits."9 3 In this situation, a prospective patron may see
the nonprofit form as a rational means of mitigating the principal-agent
problem vis-A-vis the station's controllers.
The nonprofit form may reassure prospective donors that their
preferences will prevail against those of the controllers, but also even when
these diverge somewhat from the preferences of their intended
beneficiaries. A nonprofit's beneficiaries benefit from its activities because
the donors want them to. Yet the donors and beneficiaries may disagree as
to the benefit that the former should confer upon the latter. For example,
89. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 847.
90. The metaphor of the "leaky bucket" was introduced by Arthur M. Okun. ARTHUR M.
OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 91 (1975) "[T]he money [raised for wealth
transfers through taxation] must be carried from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket. Some of it will
simply disappear in transit, so the poor will not receive all the money that is taken from the rich." Id.
These losses, he claimed, were due to the administrative costs of taxing and transferring, and also to
incentive effects. Id. at 92.
91. HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE, supra note 43, at 230.
92. Id. at 230-31.
93. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, 850.
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donors may wish to distribute in-kind benefits (e.g., food, clothing, and job
training), while the beneficiaries may prefer to receive cash gifts. 94 One
might even use the agency framework to elucidate important aspects of the
relationship between donor and beneficiaries.95 The donor (qua principal)
benefits when the beneficiary (qua agent) performs some task with care or
effort (i.e., the beneficiary uses the donation to either improve her welfare
or increase her consumption of the donor's preferred good or service). In
this sense, the nonprofit form mitigates two sets of agency costs in donative
nonprofits: (a) those imposed by a nonprofit's controllers through shirking;
and (b) those imposed by a nonprofit's beneficiaries who would depart from
a donor's wishes in order to improve their welfare by their own rights. By
mitigating both sets of agency costs, the donative nonprofit facilitates
privately-led efforts to provide public goods.
Two other factors aggravate a donor's agency costs vis-A-vis the firm's
controllers. First, the donor of a completed gift has no pecuniary incentive
to monitor the controller's performance-her financial payout from the gift
(i.e., zero dollars) does not vary. Second, when individual donors pass on
(notably a requirement for testamentary donations), they are altogether
absent, and the information asymmetry that results is chronic.
We have seen how nonprofit law helps ensure that the resources
conveyed to or generated by charitable organizations remain dedicated to
benefiting society for the long term. "Asset locks"96 ensure that assets
remain dedicated to: (a) their charitable purposes in general, and (b) the
founder's and donor's preferred charitable purposes in particular (insofar as
this is not impossible, illegal, or impracticable to do-the cy pres criteria).97
This is because a charitable organization's profits cannot be distributed to
its controllers and upon dissolution its assets must be transferred to another
charitable organization or to the state.98 Nonprofit law also helps the
94. Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifs and Gratuitous Promises,
1997 Wis. L. REV. 567, 586.
95. See generally Robert A. Katz, Can Principal-Agent Models Help Explain Charitable Gifts
and Organizations?, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 1, 4 (evaluating the utility of the "donor-as-principal approach
to charity").
96. The term "asset lock" was coined to describe the more modest constraints that apply to the assets
of "Community Interest Companies" (CICs) under U.K. law. CICs are subject to a community interest test and
an "asset lock" to ensure that the entity remains dedicated to its community purposes. Community Interest Com
pany Regulations, 2005, S.L 2005/1788 art. 1, 2 (U.K.), available at http //www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/1
788/contents/made.
97. Under the doctrine of cy pres, a charitable trust's assets may be used to fulfill a charitable
purpose other than the donor's original purpose where it becomes impossible, impractical, or illegal to
advance the original purpose, and the donor "manifested a more general intention to devote the property
to charitable purposes." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). This substitute purpose must
"fall[] within the general charitable intention" of the donor. Id
98. See generally Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 838-41
(discussing features and implications of the "nondistribution constraint" that assets cannot be distributed
74 [Vol. 35:059
The Role of Social Enterprise
founder enshrine and entrench her vision of the entity's mission from
tampering by future managers. The founder selects the initial board of
directors or trustees and can screen them carefully for commitment to her
vision. Those directors in turn select their own successors, and so on.99
(Although an asset lock mitigates some problems, it aggravates others. An
asset lock may prevent the firm from redeploying its resources to more
socially efficient uses in light of changing circumstances that fall short of
the relatively strict cy pres criteria and thus can thwart a donor's larger goal
of long-term social change.)
Even if the law permits a nonprofit to efficiently redeploy resources--say
the assets available for sale were purchased with retained earnings rather than
donor gifts, and the assets can be sold for at least their fair market value-
nonprofit managers have less personal incentive than for-profit counterparts to
pursue or approve such a redeployment. When a scrappy start-up commercial
nonprofit firm becomes sufficiently attractive, outside investors may attempt
to purchase the firm; founders and insiders with equity interests may have
great incentive to sell. But a nonprofit's controllers cannot lawfully
appropriate sale proceeds (beyond reasonable compensation) and thus may
have little to gain and much to lose-namely, their jobs. They may, therefore,
have less incentive to approve such sales, notwithstanding society's potential
gain.100 Moreover, because they are unowned, underperforming nonprofit
firms are not subject to hostile takeovers.'o' They are thus shielded from the
market for corporate control, which helps increase managerial and corporate
efficiency in for-profit firms 0 2
3. Commercial Nonprofits
A commercial nonprofit earns the bulk of its revenue by selling private
goods to paying customers for their own consumption, as opposed to
to controllers).
99. Id. at 876.
100. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del.
1986) (holding that a board negotiating a change of control, sale, or break-up of a for-profit corporation
must conduct a market check and accept the bidder offering the highest value); Ovide M. Lamontagne &
Ryan M. Williams, Case Study: Sale Of A Nonprofit-The Sale of Daniel Webster College to ITT
Educational Services, Inc., 50 N.H. BAR J. 80, 82 (2009) ("[I]t does not appear that any court has yet had
the opportunity to consider whether the so-called Revlon duties would apply to the sale of a non-profit
corporation."); Colin T. Moran, Why Revlon Applies to Nonprofit Corporations, 53 Bus. LAW. 373, 375
(1998) ("[N]o court has yet reached the question of whether Revlon duties apply to nonprofit boards.").
101. Henry Hansmann, Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Ownership Form and Trapped
Capital in the Hospital Industry 5 (Yale Law Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, Research Paper
No. 266, 2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-313827.
102. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110,
112-13 (1965) (arguing that the market for corporate control and the risk of takeover promotes managerial
efficiency in for-profit corporations).
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soliciting donations to finance the supply of goods and services to the
donor's (or nonprofit's) preferred third-party beneficiaries. Notwithstanding
these differences, Hansmann contends that commercial nonprofits serve a
similar economic role as donative nonprofits, namely, to promote efficiency
by reducing agency costs. 03
Commercial nonprofits can promote efficiency, explains Hansmann, by
reducing the agency costs that can arise when suppliers sell "complex
personal services."'a This category of private goods includes nursing
homes, day care, schools, and hospitals that provide certain "subtle" and
"nonstandardized" services whose quality some customers may find
difficult to assess. 05 In such situations, customers may rationally prefer to
patronize a nonprofit firm for all the reasons previously discussed-namely,
its organizational form signals that its controllers are more craftsmanlike
and less greedy than for-profit competitors, and so are less likely to exploit
information asymmetries to enrich themselves at their payors' expense.
The problem of "contract failure," Hansmann observes, is generally
less serious in commercial nonprofits than donative ones. 06 A payor is
typically better able to evaluate goods and services that she purchases for
herself, as compared to those she pays an intermediary to supply to third
parties-potentially distant and unknown to her-who belong to her
preferred charitable class.
What, if any, is the connection between social entrepreneurship and
Hansmann's "contract failure" analysis of commercial nonprofits? Paying
customers of private goods may not know or care whether an enterprise is
organized as a nonprofit or also produces public goods. Yet consider the
matter from the social entrepreneur's perspective. The social entrepreneur,
like the craftsmanlike person, has a higher calling than mere pecuniary gain.
In a nonprofit, the controllers have no investor-owners to demand that they
trade off mission for greater profits. If the entity sells superior or merit
goods-health, education, high culture, etc.-then its consumers cannot
help but produce positive externalities. If the entity sells ordinary products
to customers who are indifferent to its mission, it can use the sale proceeds
to finance its mission-related activities. The classic example is New York
University School of Law, which once owned and operated C.F. Mueller
Company, a leading pasta manufacturer, and used the net profits to support
legal education. 0 7
103. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 862.
104. Id. at 862-63.
105. Id. at 863-66.
106. Id. at 863.
107. John Brooks, The Marts of Trade: The Law School and the Noodle Factory, NEW YORKER,
Dec. 26, 1977, at 48; Alexander R. Hammer, Foremost-McKesson to Purchase Mueller Stock, N.Y.
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Of course, some of a nonprofit's customers may embrace its social
mission and partly for this reason prefer its products over those of a for-
profit competitor. For example, some parents who pay full tuition at a
private school know that they are subsidizing scholarships for deserving
children with less financial means and are pleased because it exposes their
own children to more diversity. These purchasers are partly consumers and
donors. In such cases, as Hansmann observes, "there is a substantial
donative element to many commercial nonprofits."'0 8 He posits that:
[C]ommercial nonprofits commonly serve in industries where it
is difficult to specify with any precision just what services the
organization is to provide to a patron; rather, the patron generally
must yield some discretion to the organization in this regard.
Thus, payments made to commercial nonprofits are, to an extent,
contributions to the organization to be used as the organization
chooses-constrained, again, by the purposes set forth in its
charter. 109
Where information asymmetry is severe, it may be reasonable for a
nonprofit's consumer/donors to expect its controllers, who are bound by the
non-distribution constraint and mission mandate, to better serve both them
and their intended third-party beneficiaries.
D. Government Policy Toward Nonprofits
Through various means, government promotes the creation and
flourishing of nonprofit organizations that address, social problems.
Governments do so in part in order to shift the burden of addressing these
social problems to private entities. State organizational law supplies an off-
the-rack legal form-the nonprofit corporation-that is available to most
nonprofit organizations, and another form-the charitable trust-
exclusively for charitable nonprofit organizations. These forms and their
related bodies of law reduce the transaction costs involved in setting up and
governing a nonprofit organization. These forms also enable parties to
achieve certain goals that cannot be practicably achieved through ordinary
rules of contract, property, or agency."10 For example, if a nonprofit
TIMES, Sept. 29, 1976, at 71.
108. Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 873.
109. Id.
110. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law 1-2 n.2
(Yale Int'l. Ctr. For Fin., Working Paper No. 00-11, 2000), available at http-/papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?
abstractid=229956 (focusing on the enabling aspects of organizational law and the otherwise unattainable
possibilities it creates). "Arguably the tools of the common law are inadequate to permit imposition of
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corporation or charitable trust goes bankrupt, the entity's tort creditors have
no claim to its restricted assets, which must remain committed to charitable
purposes."1
Federal tax law and state organizational law help charities raise
revenue from donations. Federal tax law permits donors to charities to
deduct their pecuniary contributions from their income taxes.'12 It also
exempts charities from the corporate income tax'' 3 and does not tax them
on profits from donations. State trust law encourages donations to charities
by providing assurances to donors that the donee entity will honor their
charitable wishes.1 4 Charitable trustees have a fiduciary duty to advance a
donor's specified charitable purpose, absent extenuating circumstances." 5
This duty also applies to the directors of a charitable corporation insofar as
it receives restricted gifts." 6 This duty is not obviated by the termination or
dissolution of a charitable organization.' '7 If that occurs, the charitable
assets will be transferred to another charity and thus remain within
charitable channels." 8
Government also promotes nonprofit activity by permitting charities to
generate some revenue from business activities. State organizational law
permits charities to engage in business activities, so long as the profits are
used for charitable purposes and not distributed to insiders as dividends." 9
perpetual obligations on self-appointing managers who cannot-because of the absence of control over them-
be considered agents of any party in interest In this respect, then, the law of charitable trusts and nonprofit
corporations adds something to the law, beyond asset partitioning, that is 'essential' in the sense we use here: it
could not feasibly be replicated in the absence of organizational law." Id. at 41.
111. Id.at5.
112. I.R.C. § 170(c) (2006).
113. Id. § 501(c)(3).
114. See Paul Ingram & Karen Clay, The Choice-Within-Constraints New Institutionalism and
Implications for Sociology, 26 ANN. REv. Soc. 525, 531 (2000). "[T]he state may smooth exchange
between its subjects by providing institutions that allow them to make credible commitments. This can
be achieved if the state provides a legal system to protect property rights, decrease transaction costs, and
enforce contracts." Id.
115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
116. Id§399cmt.a.
117. Id. §399.
118. Id. at cmt. a.
119. See, e.g., People ex. rel. Groman v. Sinai Temple, 99 Cal. Rptr. 603, 606 (1971). California
nonprofit corporations code does not prohibit such entities from earning or accumulating profits.
"Instead, the statute requires that the purposes 'do not contemplate the distribution of gains, profits, or
dividends to the members.' The use of the word 'distribution' indicates that the accrual of gains is not
thereby prohibited." Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 cmt. c (1959) ("A trust to establish
or maintain an educational institution or hospital or home for poor persons is charitable although it is
provided that the pupils or patients or inmates shall pay fees or otherwise contribute to the expense of
maintaining the institution if the income so derived is to be used only to maintain the institution or for
some other charitable purpose.").
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This law focuses on how an entity uses its net earnings, not how it earns
them.120
Through selective taxation, federal tax law encourages charities to
engage in certain types of business activity more than others. It does not tax
a charity's net earnings from a business activity that is deemed "related" to
its charitable or exempt purposes-apart from generating revenue to finance
its charitable activities. 12 1 This may be where the "conduct of the business
activities has [a substantial] causal relationship to the achievement of' an
entity's charitable or exempt purpose. 122 At the same time, federal tax law
discourages unrelated business activity by imposing the aptly-named
Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT), which requires an otherwise
exempt organization to pay corporate income tax on the profits earned from
an unrelated trade or business that is regularly carried on.12 3 Moreover, if
the entity engages in an "excessive" amount of unrelated business activity,
it can lose its exemption altogether.12 4
A sufficient relationship or relatedness may be found "[w]here the
production or distribution of the goods or the performance of the services
[from which the gross income is derived] ... contribute importantly to the
accomplishment [of those] purpose[s]."l25 The exempt business activity
may involve selling a product whose use and consumption substantially
advances the mission. Consider an organization that aims to improve
healthcare for children by encouraging children to wash their hands as a
means of preventing infection.126 This entity sells a distinctive certificate
form to hospitals, day care centers, etc., on which to print the name of a
child who has agreed to wash his or her hands and which the child will
ideally honor and cherish (or at least post on the family refrigerator). The
net revenues are not taxed because the underlying business activity
substantially advances the organization's purpose.. Each fill-in-the-name
certificate sold has the potential to kill millions of illness-inflicting germs.
120. This focus was the rule under federal tax law until 1950, when Congress enacted the
Unrelated Business income Tax (UBI). See, e.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S.
578, 581 (1924) (finding that income tax exemption for charitable nonprofit corporations "says nothing
about the source of the income, but makes the destination the ultimate test of exemption").
121. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006) ("The term 'unrelated trade or business' means ... any trade or
business the conduct of which is not substantially related (aside from the need of such organization for
income or funds or the use it makes of the profits derived) to the exercise or performance by [an exempt]
organization" of its exempt or charitable purpose or function).
122. Treas. Reg. § 1.5 13-l(d)(2) (2009).
123. Id. § 1.501(c)(2)-l(b).
124. Id. § 1.501(cX3)-l(c) to (e) (providing that substantial unrelated business activity will disqualify
an organization from tax exemption).
125. Id. § 1.513-l(d)(2).
126. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-33-034 (May 20, 1986).
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Alternatively, the exempt business activity may involve a distribution
process that advances the mission, even though the product itself and its
mode of production are incidental. Members of the Girl Scouts do not make
or package the cookies they sell, and the cookies' consumption by their
buyers produces no manifest public benefit. Even so, Girl Scouts who sell
cookies do more than simply finance other Girl Scouting activities.127 "The
activity of selling cookies," the organization asserts, "is directly related to
our purpose of helping all girls realize their full potential" because it helps
Girl Scouts practice life skills like goal-setting, money management, and
teamwork.128
A related business activity can involve a production process that
advances a charitable mission. Consider an organization that manufactures
toys and distributes them through regular commercial channels, in order to
provide vocational training for the under-skilled or under-employed
persons.' This business activity is sufficiently mission-related so that its
net earnings are not taxed.130
Federal tax law also aims to discourage commercial nonprofits from
acting too much like their for-profit counterparts, that is, from conducting
their activities in the same manner as conventional for-profit businesses in
the same sector.131 This is known as the "commerciality doctrine." 3 2 If a
nonprofit's business behavior is found to essentially mimic that of its for-
profit competitors, its tax exempt status may either be denied or the
resultant profits subjected to income tax.133
E. Rationales for Government Policies Towards Nonprofits
The advantages that government confers upon charitable organizations
are not without a cost. The tax advantages-tax exemption and the
127. Girl Scouts Cookie Program, GIRL SCOUTS, http://www.girlscouts.org/program/gscookies
(last visited Sept. 18, 2010) (explaining that proceeds of cookie sales "support Girl Scouting in the local
community").
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Rev. Rul. 73-128, 1973-1 C.B. 222.
130. Id
131. BRUCE R HOPKINs, THE TAX LAW OF UNRELATED BusINESs FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
§ 7.1 (2005).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Airlie Foundation v. IRS, 283 F. Supp. 2d 58, 66 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying tax
exemption to a foundation that operates a conference center "in a manner consistent with that of a
commercial business"); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 00-21-056 (Feb. 8, 2000) (finding that entity's income from tea
room is subject to UBIT where, inter alia, "(a) its operations are presumptively commercial, (b) it
competes directly with other restaurants, (c) it uses profit-making pricing formulas common in the retail
businesses, (d) its hours of operation are competitive with other commercial enterprises, and (e) [the
entity] lacks plans to solicit donations from the general public").
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charitable contribution deduction-are especially costly.134 The general
view is that these tax advantages are subsidies whereby the government
encourages nonprofits and donors to engage or support charitable
activity.'3 Hansmann's defense of these tax advantages is (naturally) more
economic. The inability of nonprofits to sell equity shares, he argues,
reduces social welfare in those sectors where nonprofit organizations are
more efficient than for-profit firms.'36 Without access to equity capital,
nonprofits must seek alternative sources to finance their expansion (e.g.,
retained earnings, donations, and debt). These alternative sources,
Hansmann posits, may nonetheless be insufficient to permit nonprofits to
expand to their socially optimal capacity.137 Tax exemption enables a
nonprofit to retain more of its earnings than comparable for-profit firms in
the same sector. In this way, tax exemption "serves to compensate for
difficulties that nonprofits have in raising capital. .. .138
Under Hansmann's "capital subsidy" theory, there is a relatively weak
connection between social entrepreneurship and government advantages for
charitable nonprofits. Hansmann's analysis of tax exemption is generic in
that it can apply to most commercial nonprofits in situations of "contract
failure," including those entities that sell purely private goods.139 Contrast
this with Professor Crimm's approach, which focuses on commercial
nonprofits that seek to supply mixed public/private goods (i.e., private
goods with significant positive externalities).14 0 These nonprofits may find
it difficult to bundle in substantially more positive externalities per unit of
private good than conventional for-profit firms selling the same private
134. Nonprofits, SUBSIDYSCOPE, http://subsidyscope.org/nonprofits/summary (last visited Sept.
18, 2010) ("[T]he federal government lost approximately $50 billion in forgone tax revenue in fiscal
year 2008 due to tax expenditures that specifically target activities involving nonprofits . . . .") (citation
omitted).
135. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983) (finding that tax-exempt
charities confer a benefit that "the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to provide, or
which supplements and advances the work of public institutions already supported by tax revenues"); Overview
of the Tax-Exempt Sector: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (Testimony
of John Colombo, Professor), available at httpI//waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings/testimony.aspxTID-937
("Although we academics cany on a lively debate about the rationale for charitable tax exemption, all of us
would agree, I think, that at some level exemption for charities is tied to a concept that they are improving
general public welfare in some way."); John D. Colombo, The Marketing ofPhilanthropy and the Charitable
Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 657, 682 (2001) (stating that the public benefit theory is the "most widely accepted rationale").
136. Henry Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from the
Corporate Income Tax, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 72 (1981).
137. Id.
138. Id
139. The analysis is applicable insofar as under-capitalized nonprofits provide these private
goods more efficiently than for-profit competitors or could provide them more efficiently if they were
able to scale up. Id. at 74-75.
140. Crimm, supra note 62, at 441, 450-51.
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good. This is because self-interested consumers who want the private
component of these mixed goods may be unwilling to pay higher prices in
order to subsidize the positive externalities a nonprofit seeks to generate. In
Crimm's view, tax exemption helps level the playing field between
nonprofits and for-profit firms that compete for buyers of the same good.14 1
With the additional retained earnings, nonprofit firms can increase the
public good/positive externalities that accompany each private good they
sell without having to raise their prices.
The foregoing analyses help explain the role of government subsidies
for commercial nonprofits. What explains the differential treatment of
nonprofit commercial activities? Why does federal tax law channel
commercial nonprofits into mission-related business activity and encourage
these organizations to conduct this activity in a manner that qualitatively
differs from its for-profit competitors? Why do nonprofits pay the same tax
on unrelated business income as for-profit firms engaged in the same
business activity? The received explanation is that UBIT helps protect for-
profit firms from unfair competition from charitable tax-exempt suppliers of
the same goods.14 2 Government, it seems, should not skew the regulatory
playing field too heavily in the nonprofits' favor.
If we accept a subsidy explanation of tax advantages for charities, then
UBIT and the commerciality doctrine serve no obvious purpose. Exempting
the income that a nonprofit organization earns from any type or manner of
nonprofit business activity can subsidize its provision of public goods.
Professor Ethan Stone provides a more satisfying explanation of the origins
of UBIT, which Congress enacted in 1950.143 In his view, UBIT's
enactment is best understood as "political symbolism": it reflects the
policymakers' perceptions as to which business activities were more
consistent with their conception of "charitable" and which were less so.
Stone argues that "UBIT was largely designed to keep charities from
wandering too far from traditional good works that defined the charitable
sector."'" The most egregious example of this is the previously mentioned
story of New York University School of Law's acquisition of a pasta
company in 1947.
141. Id. at 462.
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (2009) ("The primary objective of adoption of the unrelated
business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the unrelated business
activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt business endeavors
with which they compete.").
143. Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political Function
of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1479 (2005).
144. John D. Colombo, Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on Commercial Activity by
Charities, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 667, 670 n.16 (2007) (discussing Stone's analysis).
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So what has UBIT accomplished? The tax itself yields only modest tax
revenues. For example, in 2008, the country's 91 largest charities reported
$419.1 million in income, but paid only $3 million in UBIT.145 Several
factors can explain this low figure. UBIT has likely pressured many
nonprofit organizations to avoid or abandon business activity subject to
UBIT. Those nonprofits that do engage in unrelated business activities may
underreport it due to sloth, ignorance, or cleverness (i.e., they offer push-
the-envelope explanations as to how seemingly unrelated business activities
directly advance their missions).
At the same time, federal tax law's treatment of nonprofit enterprise
has encouraged more profound changes. This treatment challenged
nonprofit organizations to develop creative models of profitable earned-
income activities that integrally and inextricably relate to their public
benefit missions and that also increase efficiency by taking advantage of
economies of scale. These endeavors have genuinely advanced the concepts
and causes of social enterprise and social entrepreneurship.
Consider Ten Thousand Villages, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization
that helped initiate the movement for global "fair trade." 4 6 It was among
the first to articulate and implement "the idea that poverty can be alleviated
if tiny businesses in poor countries are able to sell their goods in rich ones
for a decent price."l 47 Ten Thousand Villages traces its origins to 1946,
when a Mennonite missionary and relief worker in Puerto Rico undertook
to help impoverished communities by stimulating the market for handicrafts
of local artisans.14 8 In fiscal year 2010, the organization purchased items
145. Peter Panepento & Grant Williams, A Question of Calculation, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
Feb. 7, 2008, at 33.
146. FAQs, TEN THOUSAND VILLAGES, http://www.tenthousandvillages.com/php/about.us/about.
faqs.php (last visited Sept. 6,2010) [hereinafter FAQs, TEN THOUSAND VILLAGES] ("Ten Thousand Villages is
a founding member of World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO) and a longstanding member of the Fair Trade
Federation (FTF), two groups committed to the ideal that every worker should receive a fair wage for their
work."); see also, Ten Thousand Villages Report, GUIDESTAR, http://www2.guidestar.org/organizations/31-
1690588/ten-thousand-villages.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) ("As a nonprofit, we achieve this mission by
building long term buying relationships in places where skilled artisan partners lack opportunities for stable
income. Product sales help pay for food, education, healthcare and housing for artisans who would otherwise
be unemployed or underemployed."); Ten Thousand Villages' Tax Form 990 (2007), amailable at
http-//nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/showVals.php?ein-3l1690588 (follow "2007" hyperlink) ("Ten
Thousand Villages' primary purpose is to care for those in need in the name of Christ, primarily by providing
vital, fair compensation to people of low income in developing countries, selling their handicrafts and other
products, and telling their stories in North America.") (formatting altered).
147. Ashlea Ebeling, Ten Thousand Villages Grows with Fair Trade, FORBES, Sept. 7, 2009, at
66, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2009/0907/creative-giving-ten-thousand-villages-grows-
with-fair-trade.html.
148. FAQs, TEN THOUSAND VILLAGES, supra note 146. Until 2000, Ten Thousand Villages was
run directly by the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC), id, a missionary, relief, and antiwar agency
run by Mennonite and Brethren in Christ congregations in the U.S. and Canada. FAQs, MENNONITE
CENT. COMM., http://mcc.org/about/faq (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). In that year, it was set up as a
separate, tax-exempt nonprofit corporation and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the MCC. FAQs, TEN
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from 127 artisan groups in 37 countries, mostly in the Third World, and
generated $23.4 million in sales, mostly in North America.14 9 The
organization advances charitable goals through a range of commercial
activities and practices. In addition to providing steady work for artisans, it
also provides loans to artisans who are too poor to qualify for traditional
bank loans. In many other ways, it assumes the economic risk that would
otherwise be borne by the artisans.'50
Some of the people who buy Ten Thousand Villages' imported
products are undoubtedly influenced by the organization's mission. The
company's typical consumer, reports Forbes, is "an educated, socially
conscious woman, aged 25 to 54, with a household income of $70,000 to
$100,000."s5 These consumers may be willing to pay a premium for these
products in order to feel "virtuous about buying."' 52
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has recognized some "fair trade"
business activity as mission-related and thus not subject to UBIT. This was
true for Aid for Artisans, founded in 1976, which sought to provide
economic assistance to disadvantaged handicraft artisans overseas, which in
turn would benefit the disadvantaged communities in which the artisans
lived.15 3 It also sought "to educate the American public in the artistry,
history and cultural significance of such handicrafts."' 5 4 In 1978, the U.S.
Tax Court found that these purposes were exempt or charitable, and that the
organization advanced its charitable purposes through its commercial
activities-purchasing and importing handicrafts made by the artisans and
distributing and selling the handicrafts in a manner designed to educate the
buyers.15 5
THOUSAND VILLAGES, supra note 146.
149. Ten Thousand Villages Annual Report 2009-2010, TEN THOUSAND VILLAGES 3 (2010),
available at http://www.tenthousandvillages.com/pdflAnnualReport_2010.pdf.
150. Ten Thousand Villages Annual Report 2007-2008, TEN THOUSAND VILLAGES 3 (2008),
available at http://www.tenthousandvillages.com/pdflAnnual%20Report%2007_08v6.pdf. "Artisans
receive up to 50 percent in cash advances when an order is placed and payment in full when an order is
shipped. Many artisans are too poor to qualify for traditional bank loans, and advance payments provide
the necessary funds to let them cover the costs of materials and equipment without going into debt. By
making prompt final payments when the order is shipped, Ten Thousand Villages takes on the business
risk associated with getting the product to market." Id (emphasis in original). Ebeling, supra note 147,
at 66 ("Ten Thousand Villages does not take items on consignment; it, not the craft workers, absorbs the
loss if a product doesn't sell.").
151. Ebeling, supra note 147, at 66 (emphasis added).
152. See, e.g, id Among other factors, Ten Thousand Villages' "charitable hook seems to have
sheltered it from the worst of the recession. Sales were down 6% in the last fiscal year, compared with a
13% drop at for-profit Pier 1 Imports." Id.
153. About ATD: Mission & History, AID TO ARTISANS, httpJ/www.aidtoartisans.org/about_ata/
mission and~history/ (last visited Oct. 7, 20 10).
154. Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202,204 (1978).
155. Id
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The term "social enterprise" has no legal significance under the law of
tax-exempt or charitable organizations. Even so, the term connotes the
distinctive nature and spirit of mission-driven nonprofit commercial endeavors
like Ten Thousand Villages and Aid to Artisans. Such entities embody the
conception of nonprofit social enterprise implicit in tax-exempt law.
II. THE FOR-PROFIT SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
A threshold challenge for aspiring social entrepreneurs is selecting and
crafting the best legal structure for their social enterprise.156 A recent survey
showed that 71% of social entrepreneurs believed that the choice of legal
structure was the single greatest challenge for their ventures. 57
Legal practitioners and academics in increasing numbers have begun
struggling with the issue.158 Although the nonprofit form is inherently
conducive to socially-beneficial undertakings, it nonetheless also has
drawbacks. Additionally, some social entrepreneurs and proponents
perceive problems with conventional for-profit forms, such as legal and
structural limits on their ability to pursue social aims at shareholders'
expenses 5 9 or to entrench the entity's long-term pursuit of social ends.16 0
For-profit social enterprises can address some of the real or perceived
shortcomings associated with commercial and donative nonprofits. With the
right organizational form, a social enterprise can have both greater access to
equity capital and a deeply embedded, sustainable commitment to social
purposes
This Part proceeds as follows. First, we identify the key features of for-
profit social enterprise. These features might be contested (or relaxed); if
they are, then other organizational forms already exist to accommodate their
characteristics. Second, we identify certain problems with nonprofit
organizations and show how for-profit social enterprise may address these
156. We assume here, as Hansmann and Kraakman have noted, that the purpose of
organizational law is "presumably to serve the interests of society as a whole." Henry Hansmann &
Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 18 (Reinier R. Kraakman et al. eds., 2004).
157. Bromberger, supra note 68, at 2 (referring to a recent study by the Social Enterprise
Alliance).
158. See, e.g., id. (describing the lack of an appropriate legal form for social enterprises).
159. See, e.g., Antony Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107
MICH. L. REv. 979, 987-93 (2009) (discussing the perception that corporations must pursue shareholder
wealth maximization).
160. Some are even alleged to have "form envy," focusing on the advantages of other legal




problems.' 6 ' Third, we look at new problems that for-profit social enterprise
might create.
A. What Is For-Profit Social Enterprise?
For-profit firms seek to produce and sell goods and services for
personal consumption. A for-profit social enterprise seeks to do so in a
manner that generates more public benefit or positive externalities than
would a conventional for-profit firm.162 In contrast to an ordinary
commercial business, it expressly measures its success both in terms of its
financial performance (e.g., pecuniary profits, shareholder value, return on
investment, etc.) and its success in advancing a social mission or addressing
social concerns.163 It is thus said to have a "double bottom line."16l This is
another way of saying that it seeks to "do well" for its owners while "doing
good" for society.
Profits are not a for-profit social enterprise's sole objective. Although it
shares the profit-making goal of a business corporation, it embraces the
duty to sometimes make decisions that will not maximize profit. A for-
profit social enterprise also shares some of the social aims of a public
benefit nonprofit organization. It must have at least one express purpose to
confer social benefits (i.e., supply public goods or mixed goods/private
goods with significant positive externalities) above and beyond those
conferred by the typical business.165 Alternatively, it could seek to impose
less social harm on third parties and the environment (i.e., negative
externalities) than the typical business.
To formally distinguish a for-profit social enterprise from an ordinary
business, its controllers must have lawful discretion to transparently reduce
shareholder wealth in order to make presumably larger improvements in
social welfare. This means that the firm may sometimes make trade-offs
161. Many proponents of for-profit social enterprises (including/especially those who advocate
new organizational forms for them) usually accompany and/or base their advocacy in critiques of
nonprofit social enterprise. See, e.g., Bromberger, supra note 68, at 2 (describing the difficulty
nonprofits have in accessing equity and distributing profits).
162. A successful traditional for-profit may also create significant social value or positive
externalities, such as those that result from the consumer surplus the business creates for purchasers of its
goods and services; the taxes it pays; the jobs it creates for its employees and those of its suppliers; etc.
163. BREWSTER BOYD ET AL., HYBRID ORGANIZATIONS: NEW BUSINESS MODELS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP 18-19 (2009) (stating that social enterprises are characterized by "non-
financial performance valuation").
164. Some commentators advocate a "triple bottom line" whereby firms measure their success
along three dimensions--economic, social, and environmental (a.k.a., "people, planet, profit"). See, e.g.,
ANDREW W. SAvrrz & KARL WEBER, THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE: How TODAY'S BEST-RUN
COMPANIES ARE ACHIEVING ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS-AND How You
CAN Too xii-xiii (2006).
165. Sabeti, supra note 24, at 5.
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between social and financial performance that preference social
performance over profit.'6 6 This commitment, although difficult to legally
enforce,167 goes beyond the promise of corporate social responsibility to
make decisions that, all things being equal (i.e., where wealth-maximizing
shareholders ought to be indifferent), will confer more benefits on society
rather than less.' 68
Typically, a social enterprise attempts to address some market failure
but it could also seek to address distributional inequality. For example, a
for-profit social enterprise may attempt to increase the suboptimal supply of
a public good, which might then improve the welfare of a population or
community that constitute a "charitable class" under charity law (e.g., an
economically disadvantaged population). It might also seek to generate
goods or outcomes that are deemed environmentally or morally superior,
such as reducing wealth disparity, even without increasing net social
wealth. 69
The social purpose may be legally charitable, 17 0 but it could be
broader.' 7' "Social purpose" is not a legal term of art like "charitable
purpose," whose meaning has been elaborated by the common law over the
course of centuries and by tax law for a century.172 The purposes and
activities that can qualify as legally "charitable" are more predictable than
those that a social entrepreneur might deem pro-social. 73 For example,
paying a higher than market salary to a small class of employees (or
166. See, BOYD ET AL., supra note 163, at 12-13 (citing Oliver Salzmann, Aileen lonescu-
Somers & Ulrich Steger, The Business Case for Corporate Sustainability: Literature Review and
Research Options, 23 EUR. MGMT. J. 27, 27-36 (2005)).
167. See generally, infra notes 207-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of why a lack of
external legal enforcement in for-profit social enterprises may be less troubling than it initially appears.
168. See, e.g., Aspirations for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), HONEST TEA,
http://www.honesttea.com/mission/about/overview (last visited Sept. 2, 2010) ("When presented with a
purchasing decision between two financially comparable alternatives, we will attempt to choose the
option that better addresses the needs of economically disadvantaged communities.").
169. This latter approach is really an attempt to internalize and ultimately reduce the negative
externalities from some activity or industry that other participants in the industry (including their
competitors) ignore. For example, Sun Ovens sells solar-powered ovens in part to replace the use of
wood and charcoal for cooking, and thereby reduce health hazards from this activity. Benefits,
SUNOVENS.COM, http://www.sunoven.com/international/benefits.php (last visited Sept. 6, 2010).
170. See supra notes 56-69 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
172. We do not intend to overstate the coherence of the legal definition of "charitable." For
example, "charitable" may be defined differently for charitable trust law, state and local property tax
exemption, 501(c)(3) tax exemption, and charitable deduction. See John G. Simon, Is There a Law of
Charity?, Paper Presented at the Nat'l Ctr. on Philanthropy & L. Ann. Conf. 2-4 (Oct. 2002), available
at http://wwwl.Iaw.nyu.edu/ncpl/pdfs/2002/Conf2002 Simon Final.pdf.
173. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 460-61
(1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by the law.").
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subcontractors, like Guatemalan tea growers) may not qualify as charitable
but would be a legitimate social purpose. 174
Social purpose undoubtedly includes non-pecuniary factors. 175 For
example, people may well prefer a society that has a more equal distribution
of wealth. Consider a business that pays its poorest employees higher than
market wages-it distributes to one set of economically disadvantaged
stakeholders a greater share of its profits than they could obtain through
market transactions. 176 Thus, the promotion of greater equity or fairness,
also referred to as distributive justice, in the distribution of a corporation's
profits fits within the rubric of a social purpose. The United Kingdom
recognized the potential breadth of a for-profit social enterprise's purpose in
its enactment of a legal form tailored to them: a Community Interest
Company (CIC).177 A Community Interest Company must pursue a social
purpose ("community interest"), which is defined as an activity that a
reasonable person might consider as being "carried on for the benefit of the
community."' 78
There are, however, some limits on what qualifies as a social purpose.
Most notably, personal pecuniary enrichment by itself does not qualify-
notwithstanding the potential social value that can result from a self-
interested person's pursuit of enrichment. Similarly, a firm's pursuit of
higher profits for its owners and controllers is not by itself a social purpose.
Thus, companies that follow weaker forms of corporate social responsibility
(i.e., they follow pro-social practices because, or insofar as, they maximize
profits) are not for-profit social enterprises. 179  These practices are
uncontroversial, and there is nothing about a company following such
practices that would distinguish them from the traditional for-profit
174. Under some circumstances, paying above-market wages to a disadvantaged population may
be a tax-exempt or charitable purpose under § 501(c)(3). See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (exempting any
organization operating exclusively for the promotion of "social welfare").
175. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 156, at 18 n.32; see also LOUIS KAPLOW &
STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 409-36 (2002).
176. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate Law, 1 HASTINGS BUs. L.J. 87, 110
(2005) ("[Tlhe fairness of the allocation of society's wealth is an important principle for the United
States .... As a society, we look not only at the total social wealth, but also at the equality of its
distribution.") (citation omitted).
177. See generally, Community Interest Companies: Guidance Pages, REGULATOR COMMUNITY
INTEREST COMPANIES, http://www.cicregulator.gov.uk/guidanceindex.shtml (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
178. Id. at § 4.
179. Organizations following stronger forms of corporate social responsibility, such as the draft ISO
26000 standard, may well qualify as social enterprises. Guidance on Social Responsibility, ISO/WD 26000
§ 3.9 (Int'l Standards Org., Working Draft 2, Oct. 6,2006), available at http/isotc.iso.orglivelink/livelink?fim
c-Il&objld=3974907&objAction-browse (follow "N080, Second Working Draft ISO 26000" hyperlink) (last
modified June 19, 2008) (defining "social responsibility" as "actions of an organization to take responsibility
for the impacts of its activities on society and the environment, where these actions:... are consistent with the
interests of society and sustainable development; are based on ethical behaviour compliance with applicable
law and intergovernmental instruments; and are integrated into the ongoing activities of an organization").
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business. 80 Moreover, founders or institutions that wish to generate higher
profits already have various incorporated forms that suit this purpose.
Individuals who wish to maximize their personal wealth can simply stay
investors in such incorporated forms.
Guayaki, a small California-based beverage company, approaches the
ideal of a for-profit social enterprise.18 ' The company, in order to help
preserve rain forests, sells yerba mat6, a South American caffeinated plant
whose dried leaves, steeped in hot water, create a drink with a strong,
distinctive, and slightly bitter flavor.' 82 Guayaki buys yerba mat6 from
indigenous and underprivileged farmers, pays above-market prices, 83 and
enlists the farmers in reforestation projects.184 Simultaneously, it intends to
generate profits for its owners.
In order to sharpen focus, 8 5 we use the term for-profit social enterprise
to denote an organization that unlike a nonprofit, does not have a complete
asset lock (or non-distribution constraint), and unlike a for-profit
corporation, is not bound by a norm or legal requirement to maximize
shareholder wealth.' 86 Such an organization is: (a) a business (b) housed in
a single legal entity'87 (c) that is at least partly owned by equity investors,
180. As Robert C. Clark observed, "many types of corporate activities that appear to be profit-
reducing voluntary expenditures for the public good are really conducive to profit maximization in the
long run." ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.2.2 (1986) (labeling this "the monist viewpoint").
181. Guayaki, as a closely held company, does not face the same constraints as a publicly traded
company. A closely held corporation is more readily operated like a social enterprise, because it
generally does not face the pressures of (a) short-term financial reporting, (b) the market for corporate
control, or (c) the separation of ownership and control. If the owners and controllers of a closely held
corporation want to pursue social aims, their organizational form will not prevent it. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006). Note that it is only shareholders who would have standing
to object to a board's decision not to maximize profits. Id.
182. What is Yerba Mat?, GUAYAKI YERBA MATE, http://guayaki.com/mate/130/what-is-
yerba-mate%3F.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
183. Guayaki pays indigenous farmers who grow mat6 in eco-friendly ways two to three times
the market price. "Kue Tuvy " - The Ache Guayaki Preserve, Guayaki Yerba Mate, http://guayaki.com
(scroll to the bottom of the page; follow "Reforestation" hyperlink; then follow .'Kue Tuvy' - The Ach6
Guayaki Preserve" hyperlink) (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
184. About Guayaki, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://bcorporation.net/guayaki (last visited
Sept. 3, 2010) ("Each person that drinks two servings per day of Guayaki Yerba Mate [sic] helps protect
approximately one acre of rainforest every year.").
185. This definition serves our purposes in this Article. We do not claim that this is the only
definition of for-profit social enterprise or necessarily even the best one. The terms "social enterprise" and
close relative "social entrepreneurship," observes Dennis Young are, "ill defined and can be interpreted in
several ways...." DENNIS YOUNG, Alternative Perspectives on Social Enterprise, in NONPROFITS &
BUSINESS 21, 21 (Joseph J. Cordes & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2009). This hinders analysis, writes Young,
as "[d]iscussion and debate are enhanced when participants share common definitions ofterms." Id. at 23.
186. This definition thus builds on that of Dana Brakman Reiser, who distinguishes social
enterprises from "companies that make corporate contributions or practice CSR." Dana Brakman Reiser,
For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2437, 2450 (2009).
187. We thus exclude contractual joint ventures between an exempt/nonprofit and for-profit
organization. A broader definition of social enterprise would likely include some joint ventures, such as
a "whole hospital" joint venture. Such an entity can simultaneously serve the interests of each partner.
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and that simultaneously seeks (d) to advance a social mission while also (e)
generating acceptable returns for investors.' 88
Broadly speaking, doing well and doing good can be combined in
various organizational forms,189 but as suggested some combinations are
already accommodated by existing organizational forms. The archetypal
for-profit social enterprise, however, is legally organized as something
other than a conventional nonprofit organization because of the non-
distribution constraint. Absent a special form for social enterprise, it will be
organized as a business corporation or limited liability company. Even so,
the for-profit social enterprise tries to emulate many characteristics of
nonprofit organizations and partly fill the same niche.
But the question remains: How could or should an enterprise's core
commitment to a social mission be "embedded in its organizational
structure"? 190 This also is sometimes referred to as "baking in" the social
mission or "embedding" it into the organization's DNA. 91 Would the
model or archetypal for-profit social enterprise have distinctive legal
characteristics that meaningfully differentiate it from conventional for-
profit organizational forms? Can we formulate some legal characteristic that
distinguishes for-profit social enterprises, similar to the way the non-
distribution constraint marks out nonprofit organizations? That constraint,
as Steinberg writes, "provides a clear distinction [between nonprofit and
for-profits firms] that affects how the [nonprofit] organization obtains
resources, how it is controlled, how it behaves in the marketplace, how it is
perceived by donors and clients, and how its employees are motivated."1 92
The jointly-owned hospital is run so as to preserve the nonprofit partner's tax-exempt status (e.g., it
operates an emergency room open to all comers, regardless of ability to pay; it treats patients covered by
Medicare and Medicaid; or it provides some free or below-cost care to uninsured and underinsured
patients). If the joint venture is sufficiently profitable, it may also satisfy the financial goals of the for-
profit partner.
188. An acceptable rate of return will depend on the investor. It could be at the market rate or
even below the market rate if the investor is willing to subsidize the enterprise with below-market
capital because he supports its social goals. See, e.g., John Tozzi, Social Entrepreneurship: Resources
for 'Patient' Capital, NEW ENTREPRENEUR BLOG (Apr. 3, 2009, 3:00 PM) BUSINESSWEEK.COM,
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/mar2009/sb20090330_647056.htm (noting that some
angel investors, venture capitalists, and foundations "look for mission-driven businesses that don't
sacrifice financial returns at all, while others provide capital for ventures that may trade some profit for
nonfinancial returns"). The L3C is premised in part on foundations receiving below market returns on
their program-related investments, thereby subsidizing the contributions of market rate investors.
189. See, e.g., BAMBURG, supra note 160, at 113 ("Mission-driven. ventures comes in all
different flavors: for-profit, nonprofit, hybrid, public, private, co-op, employee stock ownership plans
(ESOP), community development corporations (CDCs), and forms that have yet to be invented.").
190. Sabeti, supra note 24, at 5. Proponents of the "emerging Fourth Sector" assert that the
archetypal Fourth Sector organization "has a core commitment to social purpose embedded in its
organizational structure." Id.
191. See, e.g., Bromberger, supra note 68, at 6.
192. Richard Steinberg, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 117, 118 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2006).
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The archetypal social enterprise "makes" the additional social value
instead of "buying" it. "Make" refers to generating this additional social
value as a consequence of operating its revenue-generating activity itself,193
as opposed to using some portion of its profits to make charitable
donations.194 (This is partly functional: A corporation that simply wants to
donate money to charity is, generally speaking, statutorily permitted to do
so.)'95 The commercial activities directly advance the mission instead of
simply providing a source of revenue to subsidize the mission (e.g.,
Starbucks pays fair wages to coffee growers;'96 Ben & Jerry's primarily
uses hormone-free milk bought from family farms;' 97 and Seventh
Generation produces environmentally friendly cleaning products 9 8).
The distinction is analogous to the assertion, made by Judge Frank
Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel, that a corporation can be
"characterized by a statement of capital contributions as formal claims against
the firm's income that are distinct from participation in the firm's productive
activities."' 99 In a for-profit social enterprise, participation in the firm's
productive activities is more basic or integral to the firm's identity than
donations from the corporate treasury. The more successful the business is as a
business, the more social good it generates. It embodies the social
entrepreneur's way of addressing the world's problems, which is to ask, "what
can I do, that the more I do the more good it does?"200 This distinguishes the
193. For-profit social enterprises thus closely resemble commercial nonprofits, in that they
derive the bulk of their revenue from fees from the sale of goods and services. They closely resemble
corporations in that they have profit-seeking shareholders.
194. Of course, contributions to charity may also have a beneficial impact on the corporation
itself, and may even be judged (or discontinued) based on this evaluation. See, e.g., Nell Minnow,
Corporate Charity: An Oxymoron?, 54 Bus. LAW. 997, 999-1000 (1999).
195. Corporate law in some states expressly permits such donations, in some cases without
regard to any potential benefit to the corporation. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West 1990)
(permitting corporations to "[m]ake donations, regardless of specific corporate benefit"). Admittedly, in
Delaware there is some limit on the amount of donations a corporation can make, although as Kahn v.
Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) suggests the limits are large. Id at 61 (upholding the Chancery
Court's decision that Occidental's charitable contribution to the Armand Hammer Museum, although
well above the IRS limits for the deductibility of corporate charitable donations, would be protected by
the business judgment rule). A messier example might be a corporation committed to corporate social
responsibility. Such a corporation might run into difficulties, depending on how the social responsibility
was practiced or justified.
196. Responsibly Grown Coffee, STARBUCKS COFFEE COMPANY, httpJ/www.starbucks.com/
responsibility/sourcing/coffee (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
197. Inside the Pint: Dairy, BEN & JERRY'S ICE CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/activism/inside-
the-pint/dairy (last visited Sept. 19, 2010). For a detailed discussion of Ben & Jerry's mission-related
activities, see Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale ofa
Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 221 (2010).
198. About Our Products, SEVENTH GENERATION, http://www.seventhgeneration.com/about-
our-products (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
199. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRuCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 10 (1991).
200. Andrew Greenblatt: Doing Good in the World, BATTERY PARK CITY BROADSHEET, Jan.
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for-profit social enterprise from an entity that uses profits to cross-subsidize its
mission-related activity, such as a law school that operates a pasta factory and
uses the resultant revenue towards its social mission.2 0 1
This distinction is admittedly not air-tight. When Guayaki pays South
American farmers double or triple the market price for their yerba mat6, it is
engaged in a kind of in-house philanthropy towards those farmers, one that
can be partly measured as the difference between market wages and above
market wages. It subsidizes this in-house philanthropy with profits from its
revenue-generating activities and with the savings it gains by paying below
market wages to its employees in Northern California.20 2
Absent one or more of the above characteristics, the organization is
more likely to be either unsustainable as a social enterprise in the long term
or readily served by traditional corporate or non-profit forms. Put more
succinctly, a for-profit social enterprise is organized and operated for some
purpose other than to maximize the wealth of investors. It adopts
organizational forms, structural devices, and contractual arrangements that
reflect its rejection of profit as the sole maximand and that formally commit
the organization to (sometimes) making improvements to social welfare at
its shareholders' expense. One might say that insofar as a social enterprise
is a purposive institution, it is bound by a shareholder non-primacy norm.
What would the for-profit social enterprise ideal organization form
look like? At a minimum, the structure would enhance the entity's ability
and prospects for identifying, fostering, and expanding a sustainable,
embedded social technology to achieve a desirable social mission.2 03
order to achieve this goal, the form should have several attributes. To
facilitate the entity's expansion, or "scaling up," the form should ease
access to capital investors without simultaneously jeopardizing or
compromising the mission. This includes both short-term operational risk
and longevity to address the social problem or market failure. There should,
however, be enough flexibility so that resources can be deployed away from
22, 2008, at 2 (quoting Greenblatt's definition of "social entrepreneur"). Greenblatt is a serial social
entrepreneur. He teaches a course on social entrepreneurship at New York University's Wagner
Graduate School of Public Service. See http://wagner.nyu.edu/greenblatt.
201. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
202. BOYD ET AL., supra note 163, at 69-70, 87.
203. This assumes, of course, that the creation of more and better for-profit social enterprises
will in fact contribute to aggregate social welfare. This is typically assumed, but nowhere proved. We
proceed tentatively under this assumption, but will not attempt to prove it. Rather we advance the more
modest claims: (a) for-profit social enterprise law could help aspiring social entrepreneurs and their
fellow travelers (mission-influenced investors) accomplish their goals (of triple bottom line, etc.) more
effectively than existing forms; and (b) in certain situations, an individual for-profit social enterprise
could do more for social welfare than alternative forms.
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social missions that are ineffective or no longer necessary.20
Ideally, the form itself would communicate something valuable to
mission-sympathetic parties who are also potential donors such that they
and any other stakeholders are more willing to contribute.2 05 This includes,
of course, mission-sympathetic investors who might accept below-market
returns in order to promote the social good, but it could also help attract
employees willing to accept below-market compensation. It could also
cultivate demand among consumers (or consumer-donorS206) and increase
their willingness to pay a premium for, say, sustainable goods and services.
It should encourage director performance beyond the mere absence of
venality, which suggests at a minimum there should be active monitoring
and accountability. Finally, the social enterprise form itself should be
enticing to prospective entrepreneurs, increasing their desire to engage in
social entrepreneurship and to express and entrench this desire by selecting
the social enterprise form for their business. Although there is already some
demand for an effective for-profit social enterprise form, preferably the
creation of such an organizational form would augment the demand itself.
The enactment in several states (and the United Kingdom) of new off-
the-rack organizational forms tailored to for-profit social enterprises
illustrates the perceived need. These forms include those mentioned
earlier-the L3C, the Benefit Corporation, the Community Interest
Corporation, etc.-as well as the private sector "B Lab" accreditation.
B. What Problems Might For-Profit Social Enterprise Solve?
Nonprofit enterprises suffer from several problems. These problems
include limits on a nonprofit's ability to do many things-obtain capital,
compensate founders and controllers, and mitigate agency costs between
founders and donors on the one hand and controllers on the other. These
features limit a nonprofit firm's ability to achieve its goals and more
204. Not all social enterprises will be successful, and similarly not all social enterprises will be
as successful as hoped. For example, a social enterprise that pays above market rates for tea may need to
lower those rates in order to stay competitive. Neither tea growers nor investors are served by driving a
social enterprise into bankruptcy.
205. Cf Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEx. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (2010) (noting that
for employees there may not only be the warm fuzzy glow to be enjoyed from working on social goals,
but also a warm fuzzy glow from working at a particular organization).
206. Consumer-donors are those who knowingly pay more for a product or service because of
the good it can do. In Indianapolis, for example, garbage collection is a fixed cost for householders, but
those who want to can pay extra for recycling collection. See REPUBLIC WASTE SERVICES OF INDIANA,
http://www.indywaste.com/Pages/RecyclingForTheEnvironment.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
Consumer-donors may not be necessary to the success of a social enterprise-Guayaki reports that only




broadly to redeploy its resources to more socially efficient uses.207 The for-
profit social enterprise has the potential to mitigate each of these problems.
As we have seen, nonprofit law restricts the ability of a nonprofit
organization's controllers to control its resources. These restrictions are
designed to ensure that all the resources conveyed to or generated by
charitable organizations remain dedicated to benefiting society in
perpetuity. These restrictions are imposed in the first instance by the
nondistribution constraint208-the Uiber asset lock. If the organization is
sold, the fair market value of its resources must remain in charitable
channels. 209 Donors, founders, and controllers can impose additional
restrictions on the organization and its resources.2 10 The founder also selects
the initial board of directors or trustees and can screen them carefully for
commitment to her vision.2 11
These restrictions, though designed to increase social welfare, impose
social costs of their own. A social enterprise's ability to issue equity or
ownership shares has important consequences for the entity's ability to
expand or scale up in response to increased demand or to contract in
response to shrinking demand.2 12 Because it can sell shares to investors, a
for-profit social enterprise has access to an important source of capital
unavailable to nonprofits. Nonprofits, by contrast, are generally restricted to
retained earnings, debt, and donations.
A social enterprise's ability to issue equity also has important
consequences for the compensation of social entrepreneurs, which in turn
affects their financial incentives to increase social welfare. A nonprofit
cannot issue stock options or other forms of equity compensation.2 13 As a
result, if a commercial nonprofit is successful and poised for greatness (or
at least bigness), its founder and controllers cannot readily cash out their
sweat equity or appropriate some of the social value the entity is expected
to generate post-sale. Rather, nonprofit compensation is calculated
retrospectively and not prospectively. As a result, founder and controllers
207. HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE, supra note 43, at 295-96.
208. See Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 838 and accompanying
text.
209. See HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
210. See Hansmann, The Role ofNonprofit Enterprise, supra note 44, at 853 n.55 and accompanying
text.
211. Id. at 876.
212. See Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Nonprofit Production and Competition 2-4 (Nat'1
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6377, 1998), available at http//www.nber.org/papers/w6377
(explaining that nonprofit's inability to utilize equity financing limits their ability to expand); Hansmann,
Kessler, & McClellan, supra note 101, at 18-19 (noting that as demand for acute care hospital services
declined more rapidly than hospital capacity, for-profit hospitals were most responsive to reductions in demand
for acute care hospital services, while secular nonprofits were the least responsive).
213. BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 20.5(d) (9th ed. 2007).
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may decline to sell (or "convert") a nonprofit organization to a for-profit
entity-even if such sale would increase social welfare-where the sale will
not substantially improve their personal well-being. In a for-profit social
enterprise, by contrast, investor-owners are entitled to a proportional share
of the venture's net earnings-including the proceeds from selling the
venture or from an initial public offering.
Even where nonprofit law does not prohibit profit-responsive
compensation, concerns over seemliness may have a similar impact.
Commentators have discussed (and criticized) the prevalence of a
"nonprofit ideology" whereby many think it is evil for people who seek to
do good in the world to get rich in the process. 2 16
Not only may there be a problem of incentives in a nonprofit
organization, there may also be inadequate monitoring. There are neither
shareholders who will monitor behavior nor a stock price for measurement.
Nor is there a market for corporate control, " and thus no possibility of
would-be acquirers monitoring the enterprise.218 In theory, state attorneys
general are to serve as monitors, but in practice they lack the resources to
properly pursue managerial weaknesses. As a practical matter, many
nonprofit directors can essentially satisfy their fiduciary duties by not
stealing and are generally free from effective scrutiny. By contrast, for-
profit social enterprises have owners with personal pecuniary incentives to
monitor.
C. Managing Tradeoffs Between Mission and Profit
The archetypal for-profit social enterprise seeks to generate both extra-
ordinary returns for society and acceptable returns for its owners and
investors. The tension between these two aims gives rise to a distinct set of
agency costs.
The risk that the for-profit social enterprise may subordinate social
mission to profits is most likely to occur following a change in ownership.
Attorney and author Susan Mac Cormac refers to this risk as "the legacy
214. See id. at § 20.5(f) (discussing cases where the compensation ofa nonprofit's manager may
be tied to an entity's profitability).
215. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Lawmakers, Tightening Belts, Question Nonprofit Salaries,
N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2010 at A12.
216. See generally DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: How RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS
UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL (2009).
217. Nonprofits are subject to various non-legal constraints such as competition for charitable
donations, which is especially potent for managers of nonprofits that rely mainly on a continuous stream
of donations.
218. See Hansmann, Kessler & McClellan, supra note 101, at 4-5 (explaining that nonprofits
are not susceptible to hostile takeovers).
2010] 95
Vermont Law Review
problem."21 9 "Many socially oriented for-profits," she writes, "find that
their social mission is dependent on founders' fervor, and when founders
retire or sell, their social legacy is often lost as more traditional owners and
managers take over."2 20 Similarly, entrepreneur and journalist Marjorie
Kelly worries that a social enterprise's social mission may be squeezed out
when the founders leave, sell, or go public.2 2 1 The sale of Ben & Jerry's is
perhaps the most prominent example of this.222
The legacy problem arises in part from the risk that a founder's
commitment to creating social value will lessen over time. This can be seen
as an inter-temporal agency problem between an idealist founder (principal)
and his older and perhaps more acquisitive self (agent). 22 3 In response, the
founder of a new for-profit social enterprise may seek devices-a.k.a., pre-
commitment strategies-to protect the social mission from his own self-
regarding attempts to dilute it down the road. Donating company shares to a
charitable foundation, for example, will prevent the donor from later
benefiting from any price increase. The founder can also enlist a third party
to monitor the controllers.224 The leading example of this is B Labs, the
private organization which verifies a B Corporation's compliance with
social enterprise norms.225
This formulation of the legacy problem in for-profit social enterprises
likens it to the agency problem faced by the founding donor (settlor) of a
charitable trust-namely, that successive controllers (agents) will stray
from the specific charitable mission selected by the settlor (principal). In
truth, a for-profit social enterprise is more likely to stray from the founder's
original social mission than a charitable trust. The controllers of a charitable
trust, the trustees, have some lawful leeway to redeploy trust assets away
from the settlor's specific charitable purposes, but any alternative purposes
must be legally charitable. A for-profit social enterprise, by contrast, will
have at least some owners who are entitled to appropriate some portion of
219. Susan H. Mac Cormac et al., The Emergence of New Corporate Forms: The Need for
Alternative Corporate Designs Integrating Financial and Social Missions, SUMMIT ON THE FUTURE OF
THE CORPORATION: PAPER SERIES ON CORPORATE DESIGN 88, 97 (Allen White & Marjorie Kelley eds.,
2007), available at http://www.corporation20/20.org/SummitPaperSeries.pdf.
220 Id.
221. Majorie Kelly, Pub., Bus. Ethics, Presentation at the Bus. Ethics Symp., System Design: New
Frontier for Ethical Leadership (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.e-businessethics.com/symposium/
PPTs/M%2OKelly.pdf.
222. Page & Katz, supra note 197, at 2-3 (describing the sale of Ben & Jerry's to multinational
Unilever).
223. See generally, George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, 3
J. Econ. Perspectives 181, 191-92 (1989).
224. See generally, Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 227.
225. CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, supra note 35.
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the firm's assets for their private benefit.2 26 For them, this is part of the for-
profit social enterprise's allure.
What makes the so-called "legacy problem" problematic, and for
whom? A for-profit social enterprise, after all, has private owners, and some
of them may be outside investors whose aims and interests diverge from the
founder's original vision. They may prefer greater short-term profitability
and less aggressive pursuit of that vision. In this respect, the enterprise's
controllers (typically a board of directors) are agents of multiple
principals-the founder and outside investors, among others-whose
interests may diverge.
When a for-profit social enterprise shifts away from mission and
towards greater profitability, some stakeholders may experience a windfall.
At the time of purchase, an outside investor's expectations of profits are
tempered by her awareness of the enterprise's simultaneous pursuit of a
social mission. This does not imply that the investors are expecting or
agreeing to a below market return-it may simply mean that the original'
owners subsidized the social mission by selling equity at a lower price. If
the enterprise later abandons or reduces the social mission, these investors
would receive a greater than expected return.
Attempts to address the "legacy problem" in for-profit social
enterprises can harm the interests of investors who seek robust financial
returns. Their investments may generate a lower return if the organization's
controllers too zealously pursue the founder's social mission. The
magnitude of these investors' losses is a function of their reasonable
expectations. These investors' agency costs vis-i-vis the controllers can be
mitigated with approaches that resemble those used in conventional for-
profit organizations.2 27 The founder and outside investors can share control
over the enterprise (e.g., both sit on the board of directors), which
dramatically reduces the information asymmetries that aggravate agency
costs. These control rights can be increased if, for example, the enterprise
does not meet certain financial targets. The outside investors can also
negotiate for the right to bring lawsuits against the controllers. They also
have the right to exit the enterprise altogether by selling their equity shares,
and can negotiate for other rights, such as the ability to put their shares back
to the company.
226. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
227. These approaches are not identical to those used in conventional for-profit
corporations whose investors may also be protected by the directors' theoretical duty to maximize
shareholder welfare. See Page & Katz, supra note 197.
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III. MICRO VERSUS MACRO PERSPECTIVES ON FOR-PROFIT SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE
Those who found, support, and study social enterprise have pondered
how to design sustainable organizations to address enduring social and
environmental problems. There is much concern about for-profit social
enterprises selling control to conventional businesses-an act that some
refer to pejoratively as "selling out." The fear is that resources that were in
part generating social value will now be dedicated solely to profit
maximization. Will the virtuous mouse (described as "relatively small
companies that have iconic status as socially progressive brands") be co-
opted by the "wealthy elephant"?22 8
Yet these micro questions of design and technique-how to make a
for-profit social enterprise's social mission more durable-should not
distract from the critical macro questions: How durable should a for-profit
social enterprise's social mission be made? Under what circumstances
should the demise or acquisition of a for-profit social enterprise be
welcomed rather than opposed? A broader perspective on social enterprise
focuses more on the continued creation and increase of social value and less
on perpetuating any particular entity engaged in this activity.
One economic function that social enterprise can serve is to
demonstrate the economic viability of a business activity that generates
social benefits. In other words, a social enterprise can succeed by
demonstrating that it is no longer necessary and that the market failure the
nonprofit undertook to address no longer exists. One way this can occur is
when a conventional for-profit firm acquires a for-profit social enterprise
and continues the acquired entity's social enterprise-like qualities and
activities on a larger scale. Ideally, the acquiring entity will incorporate
some of these qualities and activities into its overall operations.
A for-profit social enterprise can promote the longevity of its pro-social
innovations by embedding its social mission into its business activities. It
can do this by devising methods of producing, marketing, and distributing
its products that are assured to produce the desired social value. Professors
James Austin and Herman "Dutch" Leonard referred to this know-how as
"social technology." 229 This "social technology" is relatively hardy because
it "embeds social values into their missions, production processes, product
characteristics, organizational cultures, and relationships with their
228. James E. Austin & Herman B. "Dutch" Leonard, Can the Virtuous Mouse and the Wealthy
Elephant Live Happily Ever After?, 51 CAL. MGMT. REv. 77, 77 (2008). This idea is discussed in depth
in Page & Katz, supra note 197.
229. Austin & Leonard, supra note 228, at 79.
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employees, their suppliers, and their consumers." 23 0 So embedded, this
social technology is more likely to persist, even when the social enterprise
itself is acquired, because the acquiring company will be more likely to
perpetuate the social enterprise-like aspects of the business activity of the
acquired company.
The second way a for-profit social enterprise can increase social value
is to increase consumer demand for products that embody their social
technology. Firms that introduce new products and manufacturing methods
often stress distinctive features, even if there was no clear prior demand for
products with these features beforehand. When a product's consumers come
to value these qualities, any firm that acquires the product will feel market
pressure to preserve these qualities. Indeed, the acquiring company is likely
"betting on products with high social content becoming a salient component
of the future marketplace."231
Consider the market for natural or "eco-friendly" cleaning products.
For many years, the market was dominated by two relatively small
producers: Seventh Generation and Simple Green. In December 2007,
Clorox Company launched its Greenworks line of natural cleaning
products. 2 32 To bolster its eco-friendly credibility, Clorox sought and
obtained the Sierra Club's endorsement for these products. 2 33 Within a year
of its launch, Greenworks was the top seller in the natural cleaners
market-gaining 42%-and total sales of all natural cleaners doubled.234
Clorox's size enabled it to grab a large slice of a growing pie.
Economies of scope helped Clorox sell its Greenworks products for
substantially less than competitors.235 Clorox also used its large distribution
network to make Greenworks products more available. "Before, you had to
go to a specialty [store to buy natural cleaners]," reported an industry
analyst, while "[n]ow you can get it at Wal-Mart and Kroger's just about
anywhere."236 This availability reduced consumers' search costs for natural
cleaners, which effectively lowered their prices further. Assuming that
230. Id
231. Id.
232. Vinnee Tong, Clorox Takes Top Share of Natural Cleaners Market, ASSOCIATED PRESS
FIN. WiRE, Jan. 11, 2009 (explaining that Greenworks products are made mostly with coconut oil, corn,
and lemon and without bleach).
233. Felicity Barringer, Clorox Courts Sierra Club, and a Product Is Endorsed, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2008, at SPG2. Around the same time the Sierra Club announced its endorsement of
Greenworks products, Clorox announced that it would donate $470,000 to the Sierra Club. Tong, supra
note 232. There may be a connection between these two events.
234. Tong, supra note 232 (noting prior to Clorox's entry the natural cleaners market was
growing 20% a year).
235. Id ("Other brands [of natural cleaners] charge between 50 percent to 60 percent more than
regular cleaners while Greenworks products cost 10 percent to 20 percent more.").
236. Id (quoting Jefferies & Co. analyst Douglas Lane).
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consumers' demand for natural cleaners remained constant, the lower prices
would naturally increase sales.
Additionally, Greenworks' visibility and association with the Clorox
brand likely stimulated demand for natural cleaners in general. By
conspicuously marketing Greenworks as a Clorox product, Clorox
effectively endorsed the efficacy of natural cleaners generally. 237 If one of
Seventh Generation and Simple Green's goals was to move "green
cleaning" into the mainstream, they succeeded. They showed that the niche
could be profitable. One key reason the Sierra Club endorsed Greenworks,
according to the nonprofit's executive director, was indeed "to try to create
this marketplace."238
In other cases, the virtuous mouse could arguably achieve greater
social impact by selling an ownership stake to the wealthy elephant, rather
than by staying independent. Consider Honest Tea, the bottled iced tea
company and socially progressive start-up.239 In 2008, Coca-Cola acquired
a 40% share in Honest Tea, which had been operating as a closely-held
corporation.2 40 The rationale for the sale was that "Coca-Cola's distribution
system would enable Honest Tea to go national and achieve
profitability." 241 Some observers of the sale asked whether Seth Goldman,
who co-founded the company and served as its CEO, 24 2 had made a "deal
with the devil."243 Goldman responded that:
I believe that every time we sell a bottle of Honest Tea we are
doing a positive thing for the people picking/processing the
leaves, the ecosystem and the consumer. If you accept this first
assumption, as I do, then I believe it is my responsibility to make
Honest Tea as powerful as I can. The more we sell-provided it
is the same product we have been selling for the past ten years-
the more good we do. And the more we convince the larger
237. Jennifer Lance, Clomx Greenworks: Greenwashing or Green Cleaning?, REALLY NATURAL
BLOG (Jan. 23,2008,8:56 AM) http//www.reallynatural.com/archives/homecloroxwgreenworksgreenwashin
g.php. "We spent a lot of time talking with consumers who wanted to keep their homes clean and healthy but
wanted more natural alternatives.... [They confessed in most cases they were disappointed with having to
pay more for products that didn't work. So we concluded that we would initially bring it out with the Clorox
brand name endorsing it because it gave people a belief in its efficacy." Id. (quoting Beth Springer, Vice
President for Strategy and Growth at Clorox).
238. Barringer, supra note 233.
239. Aspirations for Corporate Social Responsibility, HONEST TEA, supra note 168.
240. Andrew Park, Did Seth Go to the Dark Side?, INC. MAGAZINE, May 2008, at 21.
241. Austin & Leonard, supra note 228, at 86.
242. Goldman is also described as the company's "TeaEO." Our Mission, HONEST TEA,
http://www.honesttea.com/mission/about/seth (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
243. Park, supra note 240, at 21-22.
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bevera e companies that there is a market for a product like
ours.
Recall that for-profit social enterprise exists to create more value than
would be generated by either a nonprofit organization engaged in a similar
undertaking (hampered as it is by reduced access to capital) or a
conventional for-profit corporation engaged in a comparable activity. So it
may be that "[t]here may be opportunities to leverage resources outside the
organization's boundaries"-including an erstwhile competitor's
resources-"than could be generated by the organization alone."24 5
From society's point of view, it is secondary which company is
creating the social value.246 By entering the natural cleaners market with its
own product, Clorox created more social value, in part by enlarging the
market and inducing some consumers to stop buying eco-unfriendly
products in favor of natural products. Those who are most concerned about
perpetuating a particular social enterprise as a separate and distinct
organization may have lost sight of the bigger picture. Which organization
creates the social value is less important than the amount of social value
created. Of course, if we believe that, all things being equal, for-profit
social enterprise should hold out rather than sell out, we may conclude that
the law should make it harder rather than easier for a for-profit corporation
to discard the social type aspects of its operations.
CONCLUSIONS
The archetypal social enterprise serves a discrete set of economic
functions-addressing market failures and distributive inequalities. It does
so, moreover, through distinctive and alluring means-operating a business
selling mixed public-private goods to paying consumers for their own
244. Seth Goldman, An Honest Dialogue with a Disappointed Consumer, HONEST TEA BLOG
(Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.honesttea.com/blog/2008/02/ (emphasis omitted).
245. James Austin et al., Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, Diferent, or Both?,
30 ENTREPREPRENEURSHIP THEORY & PRAC. 1, 18 (2006).
246. The identity of the producer is relevant. See, e.g., Jennifer Chait, Alternatives to Toxic
Cleaners, BLISSTREE BLOG (Aug. 22, 2009, 9:50 PM) http://blisstree.com/live/altematives-to-toxic-
cleaners.
If you're going to buy green cleaners ... don't be swayed by greenwashing
companies if your goal is a better green lifestyle. For example, Clorox
Greenworks is in truth, a safe non-toxic cleaner, BUT there is WAY more to
being a green company than simply making one product, dying it green, and
calling it a day. Clorox also makes mostly not eco-friendly products, many are
super toxic, and there are plenty of other actual green companies who make green
cleaners day in and day out, making them a more ethical choice.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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consumption, in a manner that generates significantly greater positive
externalities than conventional businesses in the same sector.
Nonprofit law supplies aspiring social entrepreneurs with an
organizational form and a regulatory framework in which to pursue the
social enterprise ideal. The for-profit social enterprise, where organized in a
form other than the conventional corporation, has some of the advantages of
nonprofit social enterprise, such as the ability to signal worthiness to
potential investors, customers, employees, etc. sympathetic to its social
mission. It also has the potential to address certain weaknesses of the
nonprofit form, notably the lack of access to capital caused in part by the
non-distribution constraint (and perhaps an excessive cost to society
through their preferential tax treatment). The possibility of rich rewards for
founders and early investors-if the for-profit social enterprise succeeds-
may enable the enterprise to elicit more capital, enthusiasm, and other
resources than if it were a nonprofit.2 47 The introduction of equity, and thus
equity owners, may serve to reduce agency costs between donors,
consumers, employees, and investors, on the one hand, and founders or
controllers on the other.
Not only might an organizational form designed specifically for for-
profit social enterprise have advantages in comparison to nonprofit social
enterprise, but there may also be additional advantages to society. The mere
existence of the form, complete with an implicit state endorsement, could
attract founders who might otherwise form a conventional for-profit
business. Granted, it might also attract founders who would otherwise form
conventional nonprofits, however, this risk is mitigated to the degree that
the for-profit social enterprise may create more social value than the
nonprofit. Seth Goldman of Honest Tea went to business school "with the
mindset of being an activist" and leading a nonprofit, but instead founded
and ran a successful business with a public agenda, one seen as "a vehicle
for change." 24 8 It is entirely plausible that Goldman has created more social
value through Honest Tea than he would have in a nonprofit.
At the same time, owners create issues of sustainability, as the power
to sell is a key indicium of ownership. Owners' preferences may change:
today's social entrepreneur may tomorrow be concerned about paying for
her children's college education. The social good created by for-profit
social enterprise is likely most sustainable when the value created both is
247. Honest Tea provides an example. Without the incentive of profitability Coke would never
have invested in the business, and Honest Tea would not have been able to grow as quickly without access





The Role ofSocial Enterprise
integral to the business activity itself and is perceived as such by consumers
and key suppliers of capital, labor, and other inputs. The social good is
likely least sustainable when it is dependent on the founders' or controllers'
wish to use the business activity to cross subsidize the provision of public
benefits. For the first type of for-profit social enterprise, as long as the focus
remains on results, issues of sustainability are minimized. In contrast, the
second type of for-profit social enterprise appears more vulnerable.249
Ideally, policy makers will consider the nonprofit experience with
social enterprise to better enable and facilitate aspiring for-profit social
entrepreneurs to realize their goals. They should, however, be wary of
analogs to the nondistribution constraint, as such analogs may reduce the
advantages of new organizational forms with no corresponding benefit.
249. Interestingly, this distinction between types of business activity is reflected in nonprofit
law's UBIT. I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006).
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